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Summary 
Though the practice of genocide traces its roots back to the atrocities 
committed in the ancient times, however, the international community has 
shown its reluctance to acknowledge the existence of that horrific crime. 
The impunity for the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Young Turks of 
Ottoman Empire in 1915 had a significant impact on Adolf Hitler who 
referred to the Ottoman killings of Armenians in his political speeches 
justifying Nazi’s brutal policy. His words “who, after all, speaks today of 
the annihilation of the Armenians?”1 served as a guidance for all his 
followers to act brutally and without mercy. The scale of barbarous 
atrocities committed by Nazis during the World War II shocked the whole 
Europe. Consequently, reluctance was overcome by the desire to punish 
those responsible for grievous crimes. However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials following the World War II, often seen as the victor’s justice over 
those defeated, did not acknowledge the crime of genocide regardless 
existing overwhelming evidence on genocide being perpetrated in large 
scale.  
 
Though the crime of genocide had not been explicitly recognized by the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals, the idea of the 
possibility to render international justice influenced the adoption of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(hereinafter – Genocide Convention)2. Nevertheless, the Convention being 
in force had been dormant more than forty years and thus the rules 
applicable to the crime of genocide were not applied due to the non-
existence of any international criminal tribunal having jurisdiction over the 
crime of genocide and non-interference principle to the sovereignty of 
states. It was believed that such horrific events that took place during the 
World War II would never be repeated again. Nevertheless, a temporary 
return to the past has been witnessed by the entire world community as a 
striking  ‘déjà vu’ during the Yugoslav war and the Rwandan conflict.  
 
Ad hoc tribunals3, created as a challenging response to the gross human 
rights violations in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have proved to play a key role 
in the establishment of the international criminal justice. The crime of 
                                                 
1 <www.genocide1915.info/quotes>, retrieved on January 14, 2008. 
2 The Genocide Convention, 78 UNTS 277, opened for signature on December 8, 1948 and 
entered into force on January 12, 1951.  
3 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, more commonly referred to as the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia or ICTY, is a body of the United Nations (UN) established to 
prosecute serious crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and to try 
their alleged perpetrators. <www.un.org/icty> retrieved on January 14, 2008. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is an international court under the 
auspices of the United Nations for the prosecution of offenses committed in Rwanda during 
the genocide. <69.94.11.53> retrieved on January 14, 2008.  
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genocide has been construed and applied extensively by both ad hoc 
tribunals. The crime per se turned out to be applied as an effective tool to 
punish those who aimed at the destruction of a group simply on the basis of 
its ethnicity, and the concept of genocide stepped aside from being a purely 
legalistic non-applicable provision prior to the creation of the ad hoc 
tribunals. 
 
Solid jurisprudence has been developed by the ad hoc tribunals in regard to 
actus reus of acts constituting the crime of genocide. Some progressive 
developments have been witnessed in the international criminal law such as 
singling out rape and sexual violence as a genocidal act. Historically the 
genocide has been seen in the light of the Holocaust committed by Nazi 
regime and thus it has been associated primarily with an organized mass 
killing campaign. However, the case law developed by the ad hoc tribunals 
has shown that genocide is not only about killings, it has a wider scope, 
especially in the era when the crime has taken various subtle forms. The 
chambers of the ad hoc tribunals have deliberated on mens rea of genocide 
primarily focusing on the interpretation of dolus specialis; other acts of 
genocide such as conspiracy, incitement to commit genocide, complicity in 
genocide. It is just a short overview of the hard work being conducted by the 
ad hoc tribunals.  
 
Though the ad hoc tribunals are planned to complete their work in 20104, 
the precious experience has already influenced and will definitely further 
influence   the work of the ICC5 serving as a permanent international 
criminal justice mechanism. The genocide case might be brought before the 
ICC in the future and thus the Court would need to look into the 
jurisprudence developed by its ‘predecessors’ adopting positive experience 
and avoiding the pitfalls. Although “the fact of genocide is as old as a 
humanity”6, current developments of the crime are necessary to be studied 
carefully, for the appropriate punishment for the crime of genocide is 
serving as the deterrent effect to criminals contemplating to commit the 
crime and thus preventing the occurrence of the crime in future. Successful 
prosecution for the crime of genocide would prevent perpetrators to commit 
such a crime and help to punish those responsible for the crime of genocide 
leaving no ground for impunity.  
 
The work poses many important questions and dilemmas that are of the 
great concern to both academicians and practitioners in the field of the 
                                                 
4 ICTY Completion Strategy, S/2007/469; ICTR Completion Strategy, S/2007/323 
5 The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 as a permanent tribunal to 
prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression, although it cannot currently exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
The court came into being on July 1, 2002 — the date its founding treaty, the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, entered into force — and it can only prosecute crimes 
committed on or after that date. As of October 2007, 105 states are members of the Court. 
A further 41 countries have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. <www.icc-cpi.int>, 
retrieved on January 14, 2008  
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, ”On Genocide”, in Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko and Robert Jay 
Lifton, eds., Crimes of War, New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 534-49, at 534. 
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international criminal law. What is the crime of genocide? What kind of the 
actus reus standard is to be applied while qualifying the crime of genocide? 
What does suffice the mental element of the crime?  What principles and 
standards are to be relied upon while defining and qualifying conspiracy to 
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt 
to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide? How is the current legal 
development of the crime of genocide in jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals would possibly affect the practice of the ICC? Will the ICC being 
not bound by the case law developed by its predecessors (apart from the 
case law that have become the part of the international customary law) 
consider the developed jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on the crime of 
genocide? Therefore, the study provides in depth analysis of many 
important legal issues covering the legal definition of the crime of genocide 
as formulated in the Genocide Convention, ICTY, ICTR Statutes, and the 
Rome Statute; the material element of the crime (actus reus), the mental 
element of the crime (mens rea), other punishable acts of genocide, 
including, inter alia, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, complicity of 
genocide, applicability of concepts of the joint criminal enterprise 
(hereinafter – JCE) and command responsibility to the crime of genocide, 
and the impact of the developed concept of genocide (extensively discussed 
in the Chapter I and II of the thesis) on the further practice of the ICC.  
 
By examining the legal toolkit and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the 
work concludes with the main challenges and contradictions facing the 
judges of the ICC who will interpret and apply the law and national 
jurisdictions who agreed to be included within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to explore the current development of the 
concept of genocide in international law relying primarily on the 
jurisprudence developed by the ad hoc tribunals. The solid jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals with regard to the crime of genocide is examined in the 
light of its further possible impact on the practice of the ICC. Much has 
been written about the crime of genocide in international law, however, 
genocide belongs to the category of crimes often being used as a political 
tool and thus the purpose of the studies focuses on application of strict legal 
terms while qualifying the crime as genocide. The jurisprudence of the ad 
hoc tribunals will be critically analyzed and assessed and thus both positive 
developments and pitfalls to be avoided in future genocide cases within the 
jurisdiction of both the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC will be carefully 
discussed.  
 
The study is aiming to be as a valuable piece of academic writing that could 
be used not only as the theoretical material on acquiring the knowledge on 
the current development of the crime of genocide, but also as an alarming 
indicator of the significant development of certain concepts in the 
international criminal law theory, including, inter alia, complicity, attempt 
to commit a crime, JCE, and command responsibility. Moreover, the work 
has its practical value, for the study could successfully serve as a reference 
guide on the case law of the crime of genocide for practitioners of the 
international criminal law. Many academic works have been written on the 
crime of genocide, and many conferences have been held on the topic, 
however, the major part of the academic writing is dedicated to the analysis 
of the existing case law on the crime of genocide developed within the 
framework of the ICTY and ICTR. Undoubtedly, there is a lack of research 
on the prospects of the prosecution for the crime of genocide in the ICC. 
Though the ad hoc tribunals and ICC were established under totally 
different circumstances, the harmonization of the international criminal 
justice system embedding a range of the international legal instruments, 
principles and developed jurisprudence is inevitable. The ICC being a sui 
generis criminal justice institution cannot drastically deviate from the 
principles developed by its predecessors, for a vast majority of those 
principles have become the part of customary law. Therefore, the work has 
been en effort to conduct the detailed critical analysis of the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals in regard to the crime of genocide by defining the 
positive and negative developments within the legal framework of both 
tribunals and to project how those developments might possible influence 
the ICC while charging, prosecuting, and convicting for the crime of 
genocide.  
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The work would be an asset to the existing academic writing on this issue 
because it is a crucial line for conviction and acquittal for the crime of 
genocide in the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC to work with precise legal terms to 
prosecute successfully those responsible for such a grievous crime as 
genocide. The crime of genocide has been extensively studied in the light of 
existing case law, however, it is of vital importance to project the current 
developments of the concept of genocide on further practice of the ICC that 
is supposed to serve as the leading institution to define, refine and reshape 
international criminal law and international humanitarian law. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The entire thesis has been written relying upon the critical analysis of 
international legal instruments seeking to punish those responsible for the 
crime of genocide at the international level including, inter alia, the 
Genocide Convention, ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute, and Rome Statute. 
However, the research material was not limited to specific sources thus 
extending to books, law reviews, articles and relevant case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals.  
 
The analysis was conducted from the historical perspective as well. Travaux 
preparatoires of the Genocide Convention, legacy of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo International Military Tribunals assisted significantly while outlining 
the concepts of the international criminal law applicable to the crime of 
genocide. The comparative analysis has played a crucial role while 
foreseeing the role of the current development of the concept of genocide 
within the legal framework of the ad hoc tribunals in further ICC 
proceedings on the crime of genocide. 
 
The work has been greatly influenced by the information acquired during 
the research conducted in the ICTY by working for the Popovic et. al 
(Srebrenica) case7 in the OTP. Most of the references to the existing case 
law on the crime of genocide (Chapter I and Chapter II of the thesis) were 
drawn from the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial and Final Briefs in the Krstic case8, 
Blagojevic case9, and Popovic case. 
 
1.3 Delimitation 
This study is limited to the analysis of the legal instruments and 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and its possible further impact on the 
practice of the ICC in the light of the Rome Statute10 and ICC Elements of 
                                                 
7 Popovic et al. Case No. IT-05-88. Note: The case is at the final stage of the prosecution 
phase. 
8 Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic ,Case No. IT-98-33. 
9 Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60. 
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. 
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Crimes11. The case law of the ad hoc tribunals used in the thesis is up to date 
of January 14, 2008. For the purpose of illustration of complex concepts and 
theories in international criminal law closely related to the crime of 
genocide, travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute, 
relevant UN documents and reports along with the case law of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals is referred to as 
well.  
1.4 Structure 
The master thesis is comprised of three chapters that give a comprehensive 
and detailed analysis of the chosen topic and research related issues. The 
first and the most fundamental Chapter of the thesis provides a general 
understanding of the concept of genocide in international law, the main 
international instruments seeking to punish the crime of genocide, and the 
corpus delicti of the crime. The general understanding of the crime provided 
in the first Chapter gives a solid theoretical and practical ground to 
comprehend applicability of complex and debated concepts to the crime of 
genocide in international law, including inter alia, conspiracy, attempt to 
commit a crime, complicity, joint criminal enterprise and command 
responsibility. The legal findings provided in the previous Chapters allow 
projecting current developments of the crime of genocide in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on the further possible practice of the 
ICC. The structure of the master thesis appears to be fully coherent with the 
title and purpose of conducted research. 
  
Chapter I explores the concept of genocide in international law analyzing 
international efforts to prosecute the crime of genocide in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials, prosecution of genocide in the ICTY and ICTR. The overview 
of legal instruments providing for jurisdictional ground for the prosecution 
of the crime of genocide is briefly given. The Chapter examines the 
definition of genocide, reviewing the physical element (actus reus) and the 
mental element (mens rea) of an offense. The analysis of actus reus and 
mens rea of a crime of genocide is based on the developed jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
Chapter II explores other punishable acts of genocide, including conspiracy 
to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide, complicity in genocide. The Chapter surveys 
also travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention, normative activity 
within the United Nations related to aforesaid crimes falling under the 
category of genocide. Notions of joint criminal enterprise and command 
responsibility as a pathway to prosecute and convict of genocide are also 
under review in this Chapter.  
 
                                                 
11 Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 at 108, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). 
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Chapter III is summarizing the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on the 
crime of genocide focusing on the key points in the developed concept of 
genocide. The case law of the ad hoc tribunals is projected on the possible 
further ICC practice. The Rome Statute and ICC Elements of Crimes are 
carefully reviewed so to analyze whether said legal instruments are in line 
with the current development of the concept of genocide in international 
law.  
 
Concluding remarks summarize the entire work and define the key problems 
facing the ICC in charging, prosecuting and convicting those responsible for 
the crime of genocide. Although no genocide case has been brought before 
the ICC yet, it is of vital importance to predict possible further obstacles to 
be encountered by the ICC and avoid pitfalls of the ad hoc tribunals who 
have been pivotal players in shaping the case law on the crime of genocide.  
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2 The Concept of genocide in 
International Law 
2.1 Drafting history of the crime of 
genocide 
What is the crime of genocide? Where do the roots go? Although genocide 
traces its roots back to the ancient times, the crime of genocide was not 
named by its proper name often being substituted with the term ‘mass 
murder’. Genocide has been always heavily politicized and thus recognition 
of genocide as a crime under international law has been ‘uncomfortable’ for 
states since times immemorial. The development of the international human 
rights law was an inevitable process after the World War II being associated 
primarily with the Holocaust.   
 
In the midst of the horrific acts committed by the barbaric Nazi Germany, 
the entire Europe was petrified while observing the dominance of the army, 
weaponry and outrageous acts committed by the Nazi; the inhumane 
treatment became the widespread practice along with the extermination and 
persecution. The then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill thundered 
in a BBC broadcast: “We are in the presence of the crime without a 
name”12. 
 
Eventually, the crime got its name – genocide. The term genocide was 
coined by Raphael Lemkin13 in 1944 in his book “Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe”14 as the world was confronted with new phenomenon. The term 
was purposefully invented by the author and it obviously succeeded to 
connote something evil in its scope. The word derives from the Greek 
‘genos’ (race or tribe) and Latin ‘cide’ (to kill) and thus it literally means 
‘killing of a race’.  
 
Lemkin defines genocide as “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group” that implies the existence of “a coordinated plan of different actions 
                                                 
12 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide”, Paperback 
Edition. Perennial, 2003. 
13 Raphael Lemkin (June 24, 1900 – August 28, 1959) was a lawyer of Polish-Jewish 
descent. Before World War II, Lemkin was interested in the Armenian Genocide and 
campaigned in the League of Nations to ban what he called "barbarity" and "vandalism".He 
is best known for his work against genocide. <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raphael_Lemkin>, 
Retrieved October 15, 2007 
14 Raphael Lemkin. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of 
Government, Proposals for Redress. Lawbook Exchange, 2005 (Originally published as 
Lemkin, Raphael. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
International Law, 1944). 
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aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national 
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves”15. 
 
Though the legal concept of genocide goes back to the World War II, 
genocide was, unfortunately, neglected in the judgments of International 
Military Tribunals. None of the accused in Nuremberg was convicted of 
genocide and the word ‘genocide’ did not even appear in the text of any 
judgment. However, the Prosecution in its indictment presented to the IMT 
tried to press the charges on the crime of genocide despite the omission in 
the text of the Charter of the IMT defining the crime as “extermination of 
racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain 
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people 
and national, racial or religious groups, in particular Jews, Poles and 
Gypsies and others”16. The same is true to the Tokyo Tribunal, war 
criminals were not charged with the crime of genocide17. In order to 
describe the nature of committed crimes, other terms and expressions were 
used, namely, extermination, mass murder, annihilation of certain groups of 
individuals or populations. 
 
One of the reasons that the crime of genocide was not included in the IMT 
Charter as the punishable act could be the Allies’ reluctance to deal with 
individualized victim groups due to the concept accepted by the Nuremberg 
Trial that it was individuals who were victims but not groups or nations per 
se. Another reason of the exclusion of genocide could be the fear of 
manipulation of trial by certain groups of victims as a revenge tool. The 
IMT attempted to approach the situation in a way to show the destruction of 
millions of human beings but not of particular ethnical, national or religious 
group18. One more logical explanation could be provided that is the very 
absence of the crime of genocide as the crime per se; it was of unique nature 
and it was impossible to argue that the crime had existed under the 
international law before.  
 
Nevertheless, the very absence of the reference to the crime of genocide in 
the IMT Charter and jurisprudence developed by the International Military 
Tribunals undoubtedly influenced the adoption of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.19.  
 
The Preamble of the Draft Genocide Convention referred to the IMT and its 
judgments stating “having taken note of the fact that the IMT at Nuremberg 
in Its Judgments of September 30-1 October 1946 has punished under a 
                                                 
15 Supra note 10, p. 79 
16 Indictment presented to the IMT, the USA, The French Republic; the UK and Northern 
Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et 
la., 18 October 1945, p. 43. 
17 R.J. Pritchard and S. Magbanua. The Tokyo War Crimes. The complete transcripts of the 
proceedings of the IMT for the Far East, NY/London: Garland, 1981, vol. 1. 
18 Bloxham D. Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and Formation of History and 
Memory, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
19 The Genocide Convention, 78 UNTS 277, opened for signature on December 8, 1948 and 
entered into force on January 12, 1951.  
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different legal description certain persons who have committed acts similar 
to those which the Present Convention aims at punishing”. However, the 
aforesaid provision was removed in the original convention text, for 
genocide not to be equated with the crimes against humanity considered by 
the IMT Charter20.  
2.2 Legal instruments 
2.2.1 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
The prohibition of the crime of genocide rests on the conventional and 
customary rules of international law. The centerpiece of the law of genocide 
is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly in 194821. Moreover, the 
ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide 
Case emphasized that “the origins of the Convention show that it was the 
intention of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as “a crime 
under international law”22. The outcome arising from the conception is that 
principles underlying the Convention are principles recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on states, even without any conventional obligation and 
thus the rules applying to the crime of genocide are part of customary rules 
of international law which have reached the level of jus cogens23. The 
obligation of states to prevent and punish the crime of genocide is erga 
omnes in its nature24.  
 
Regardless the extensive prohibition of the crime of genocide both under 
conventional and customary rules of international law, the Genocide 
Convention has not been applied for over forty years due to the principle of 
sovereignty of states and non-existence of an international criminal court or 
tribunal having the jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. 
2.2.2 Statute of the ICTY, Statute of the ICTR, 
and developed case law 
The establishment of the ICTY25 and ICTR26 under the Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and the development of the case law of these ad hoc tribunals 
                                                 
20 Official Record of the 3 Session of the GA, Part I, 6th Committee, Summary records of 
the Meetings, 21 September – 10 December 1958, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.109 
21 The number of states that have ratified the Convention is currently 137. 
<www.unhchr.ch>, retrieved January 14, 2008. 
22 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951, ICJ Reports 16, p. 23 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. See also: Case Concerning Apllication of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Bosnia-Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia (July 11, 1996), ICJ Reports 595, para. 31. 
25 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), of 25 
May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827. 
 12
have demonstrated the applicability and enforceability of the rules 
governing the crime of genocide at the international level.  
 
The international community has witnessed some landmark cases on the 
crime of genocide. Charges of genocide and punishment of individuals 
responsible for this grievous crime have been imposed effectively showing 
that there is no ground for impunity in future. However, there has been a 
large scale of condemnation of the international community that genocide 
has not captured enough attention to prevent and punish responsible 
perpetrators. 
 
The latest developments of international criminal law and its allegiance to 
evolving international human rights law look promising enough that 
grotesque human rights violations will no longer be tolerated by the 
international community.   
 
The practice of the ICTY and ICTR has contributed significantly to the 
development of the substantive body of the international criminal law on the 
crime of genocide. The said ad hoc tribunals, having the jurisdiction over 
the crime of genocide under their respective statutes, have interpreted and 
applied the provisions of the Genocide Convention, for the elements of the 
crime of genocide were definitely very vague and needed to be construed.  
 
2.2.3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. 
The treaty-based approach was successfully deployed by the international 
community in the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court when establishing the very 
Court. The Statute of the ICC27 was successfully adopted by a majority vote 
of 120 States in favor, 7 states against and 21 states in abstention28. 
 
Pursuant to the Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the Court exercises its 
jurisdiction with respect to the crime of genocide, as well as crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, being limited to the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. 
 
                                                                                                                            
26 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), of 8 November 1994, 
UN Doc. S/RES/955.  
27 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), of 17 July 1998, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9. 
28 <www.un.org/icc>, retrieved on January 14, 2008 . 
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2.3 Legal definition of genocide 
The definition of genocide, as provided in Article 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute, 
Article 4 (2) of the ICTY Statute, and Article 6 of the Rome Statute, cites, 
verbatim, Articles 2 of the Genocide Convention. 
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
The ICTR Trial Chamber in its Musema Judgment emphasized that for the 
crime of genocide to be established, it is necessary: 
a) firstly, that one of the acts listed under Article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute be 
committed;  
b) secondly, that such an act be committed against a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, specifically targeted as such; 
c) thirdly, that the “act be committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
the targeted group29. 
The offence of genocide is comprised of two components.  First of all, the 
conviction of genocide requires the actus reus or material element of the 
offence, consisting of one or more of the acts enumerated in the Genocide 
Convention, ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute or Rome Statute. Secondly, the 
conviction of genocide requires the mens rea of the offence, consisting of 
the special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such.30 
2.4 The material element (actus reus) of 
the crime of genocide 
The material element of the offence (actus reus) is constituted by one or 
several acts enumerated in article 2 of the Genocide Convention, Article 
2(2) of the ICTR Statute, Article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute or Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute. For the purpose of better understanding of the inclusion of 
each constitutive genocidal act in the Genocide Convention, the analysis of 
                                                 
29 Musema Trial Judgment, para. 154 
30 Krstic Trial Judgment, para.542. See also: Jelisic Trial Judgment, para.62. 
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the travaux preparatoires of the Convention focusing primarily on the 
divergence of opinions towards some debated legal concepts has been 
conducted.  Furthermore, the thorough overview of actus reus of each act 
constituting the crime of genocide relying primarily on the case law 
developed by the ad hoc tribunals is provided. 
2.4.1 Killing members of the group 
“Killing members of the group” is prohibited by the Genocide Convention 
and it constitutes the first mentioned punishable act under the Convention. 
The Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide of the U.N Secretary 
General (hereinafter – Secretary General’s Draft) prohibits “causing the 
death of members of a group or injuring their health or physical integrity by 
group massacres or individual executions”31. The Report of the Ad hoc 
Committee on Genocide to the Economic and Social Council (hereinafter – 
Ad hoc Committee Draft) modifies the said provision and simplifies it 
penalizing ‘killing members of the group’32. The very same provision is 
incorporated into the Report of the Sixth Committee (hereinafter – Sixth 
Committee Draft). Mr. Maktos, the representative of the United States, 
defined that the term ‘killing’ was chosen by the Ad hoc Committee on 
Genocide to the Economic and Social Council because “the intention was an 
important factor and the destruction of a fraction of the group would 
constitute genocide provided that the intention was to destroy the group 
totally”33 and thus unpremeditated killing cannot be recognized as an act of 
genocide.   
Accordingly, Article 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute and article 4 (2) of the ICTY 
Statute comprise three specific elements of ‘killing members of the group’: 
a) killing one or more persons; 
b) such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group; 
c) the intent from the offender’s side to kill the person or persons34. 
The ICTR Chamber in its Akayesu Judgment was concerned that ‘killing’ as 
enumerated in the Genocide Convention and the ICTR Statute itself is 
broader than the crime of murder due to the fact that ‘killing’ includes all 
forms of homicide. The term ‘killing’ corresponds to the French word 
‘meurtre’. The word ‘killing’ used in the English version is very general as 
it could include both intentional and unintentional homicides. The term 
                                                 
31 Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, Commentary, U.N Secretary-General, U.N 
Doc. E/447 (1947), [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Comment] Art. I(II)(1)(a), at. 6. 
32 Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Genocide to the Economic and Social Council on the 
Meetings of the Committee Held at Lake Success, New York, from April 5 to May 10, 
1948, 7 U.N ESCOR, Supp. No 6, UN Doc E/794 (1948), [hereinafter Ad hoc Committee 
Report], Art. II (1), at 5. 
33 U.N GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 81 mtg., at 177 (1948). Note: Response of Mr. Maktos  
to the confusion over the meaning in French text.  
34 Those constitutive elements of the crime were reflected in the  ICC Elements of Crimes, 
Article 6(a), however, not directly formulated in the text of the ICTY and ICTR Statute.  
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‘meurtre’ in the French version is more precise and under the French Penal 
Code it covers all forms of voluntary killing35. The crime of ‘meurtre’ 
implies more than ‘assassinat’. The ‘assassinat’ covers only premeditated 
murder36.  
The reference to the members of the group could be interpreted in a way that 
an act must involve the killing of at least two persons. However, the term 
may apply to a single act of killing. The working group on Elements of 
Crimes of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 
took the reference to members of the group meaning ‘one or more 
persons’37. It is reasonable to refer the quantitative dimension of genocide 
rather to mens rea involving the intentional destruction of a group ‘in whole 
or in part’ than to actus reus. The said issue would be further analyzed in 
the sub-chapter on the mental element of the crime of genocide.  
Taking into consideration the presumption of innocence of the accused and 
general principles of the international law, the ICTR Chamber in its Akayesu 
Trial Judgment construes the Article 2(2)(a) of the ICTR Statute in 
accordance with the definition of murder given in the Penal Code of 
Rwanda that defines ‘meurtre’ (killing) as the homicide committed with the 
intent to cause death38. The interpretation of the ICTR is supported by the 
travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention where premeditation as a 
necessary condition for the crime of genocide was heavily criticized and 
rejected due to the fact that the very crime of genocide by its constitutive 
physical elements necessarily entails premeditation39.  
2.4.2 Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group 
The second provision of the Genocide Convention recognizes “causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” as a constitutive act 
of the crime of genocide. The said provision provoked a heated debate both 
in U.N Secretary-General Office and the Ad hoc Committee while preparing 
the Draft Convention on Genocide questioning what exactly referred to 
‘causing serious bodily or mental harm’. 
The Secretariat’s Draft prohibits “causing the death of members of a group 
or injuring their health or physical integrity by mutilations and biological 
experiments imposed for other than curative purposes”40. The Ad hoc 
Committee’s Draft provides that “genocide impairs the physical integrity of 
                                                 
35 Article 221-1 of the French Penal Code. 
36 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para.500. 
37 Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, Article 6: the Crime of Genocide, UN 
Doc.  PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.1. See: Chapter IV, 4.3.1 ‘Genocide by killing in the ICC 
Elements of Crimes’.  
38 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 501. 
39 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd Sess., 73d mtg., at 90 (1948). 
40 Secretary-General’s Comment, supra note 27, art I(II)(1)(c), at 5. 
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members of the group”41. The Sixth Committee modifies aforesaid 
provision including both psychic and physical pain and thus the provision is 
formulated in a manner to prohibit serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group42. 
The term ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ is not defined by either Statutes of 
the ad hoc tribunals. By its terms, article 4(2)(b) ICTY and article 2 (2)(b) of 
the ICTR are comprised of three elements as follows: 
1) causing serious bodily or mental harm to one or more persons; 
2) such person or persons belong to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group; 
3) the intent from the offender’s side to cause harm to the person or persons. 
The interpretation of ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm’ is provided in 
the ICC Elements of Crimes that was drawn from the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc tribunals. The impact of the case law of the ad hoc tribunals with 
regard to every constitutive genocidal act on the further ICC practice is 
provided in the Chapter IV of the work.  
The ICTY Chamber in its Krstic Trial Judgment construes actus reus of 
‘serious bodily or mental harm’ as follows: 
Serious bodily or mental harm for purposes of Article 4 actus reus is an 
intentional act or omission causing serious bodily or mental suffering.  The 
gravity of the suffering must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and with 
due regard for the particular circumstances.  In line with the Akayesu 
Judgment, the Trial Chamber states that serious harm need not cause 
permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes 
beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation.  It must be 
harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s 
ability to lead a normal and constructive life.  In subscribing to the above 
case-law, the Chamber holds that inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual 
abuse and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily 
or mental injury43. 
The Trial Chamber in its Krstic Judgment ruled that “wounds and trauma 
suffered by those few individuals who managed to survive mass executions 
after the fall of Srebrenica enclave”44 contributed to the serious bodily and 
mental harm within the meaning of the article 4(2)(b) of the ICTY Statute. 
Provided interpretation of the term ‘causing serious bodily and mental 
harm’ was not challenged on appeal.  
                                                 
41 Ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 28, art. II(2), at 5. 
42 Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sixth 
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N Doc. A/760 (1948) [hereinafter Sixth Committee 
Report], art II(b), at 9. 
43 Krstic Trial Judgement, para.51., See also Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed 
Ruzindana,, Judgment, 21 May 1999, (Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment), 
para.109. 
44 Krstic Trial Judgment, para. 514. 
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2.4.2.1 Rape and Sexual Violence as Genocide 
Krstic Trial Judgment is in line with the Akayesu judgment recognizing that 
“rape and sexual violence may constitute genocide on both a physical and 
mental level”45. The significant value of the finding lies in the fact that none 
of the instruments of international criminal law define the crime of rape as 
an act of genocide.  
The discussion on the crime of rape is provided in the sub-chapter on 
‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ due to the 
fact that rape and sexual violence have been recognized as possible 
constitutive elements of ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm’ in the 
jurisprudence of both ad hoc tribunals. 
However, many problematic issues arise while defining rape as an act of 
genocide: namely, the definition of the rape per se in the international 
criminal law, i.e. whether the intent to destroy the group ‘in part’ requires 
the intent to destroy a substantial part, applicability of the concept of the 
JCE for rape as a genocidal act. 
The study is also exploring developed definition of the crime of rape in the 
international criminal law with regard to the crime of genocide. Due to the 
space limitations of the thesis, the analysis of the crime of rape is presented 
to show how the developed definition of the crime of rape and sexual 
violence satisfies the legal criteria of the crime of genocide.  
Summarizing the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals on the crime of rape, 
one can undoubtedly conclude that there is a lack of unanimity on the 
definition of rape itself. Two concepts were developed by the ad hoc 
tribunals in totally different dimensions. The first concept was devised by 
the ICTR in its Akayesu case focusing on the violence element and offering 
the definition of rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed 
on a person under circumstances which are coercive”46. However, the ICTR 
in its Akayesu case unreasonably stretched the definition of rape insisting 
that “sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body 
and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical 
contact”47. The ICTY Chamber in the Celibici case agreed with the 
definition of a rape developed by the ICTR in its Akayesu case considering 
the expression of violence as the core element of the crime of rape. 
Furundzija case was a landmark case, for it approached the concept of rape 
in the international criminal law applying the principles usually used in 
domestic criminal law and hence, it determined the definition of rape with 
regard to actus reus as follows: 
i) the sexual penetration, however, slight: 
                                                 
45 Krstic Trial Judgment, para. 514.  
46 Akayesu Trial Judgment, paras 598 and 688. 
47 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 688. 
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a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other 
object used by the perpetrator; or 
b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person48. 
The definition of rape was followed by the ICTY in its Kunarac case and it 
expanded on “other factors which would render an act of sexual penetration 
non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim” besides the 
factors of “coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person” mentioned in Furundzija49.  
The second approach has contributed significantly to the definition of rape 
in the international criminal law, for it furnished the existing definition with 
specific legal characteristics of actus reus. The judges in Furundzija and 
Kunarac incorporated ‘forced oral penetration’50 into the definition of rape, 
even though as a practice shows only vaginal and anal penetration is usually 
regarded as a punishable act under domestic criminal law.  
Another debate in the analysis of rape as genocidal act concerns the 
minimum number of members of a protected group, which is intended for 
the destruction. As long as the destruction is directed against the group ‘in 
whole’, no questions arise. However, the term ‘in part’ encounters the issue 
of whether there is a minimum number of the members of the group to be 
destroyed to meet the criteria of genocide. There is no requirement that it 
has to be shown that the accused intended to destroy the group ‘in part’ by 
raping a substantial part. Whether targeted group for the destruction in part 
is ‘substantial’ should be rather referred to the genocidal intent of the 
perpetrator. Once the genocidal intent is proved, the manner of destruction 
does not matter as the genocide could be perpetrated by a combination of 
acts, namely killings, torture, rapes etc51. 
The problematic issues arise while attaching the complicity along with other 
forms of criminal participation such as joint criminal responsibility to the 
crime of rape.  As a matter of fact, it is proven before chambers of the ad 
hoc tribunals that the accused perpetrated, ordered, instigated, aided or 
abetted the crime of rape. Nevertheless, the concept of the JCE might be a 
useful tool in the prosecution of rape, notwithstanding the absence of 
apparent evidence that the accused perpetrated or assisted substantially to 
the commission of the crime. In Akayesu case, the accused was convicted of 
the crime of rape, as there was enough evidence proving that he had been 
clearly encouraging and ordering assailants to rape Tutsi women52. On the 
contrary, in Kajelijeli case, the ICTR Trial Chamber did not have enough 
                                                 
48 Furundzija Trial Judgment, para.185. 
49 Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 438. 
50 Furundzija Trial Judgment, para. 182 and 184.  
51 Chile Eboe-Osuji, ‘Rape as Genocide: Some Questions Arising’, Journal of Genocide 
Research (2007), 9(2), June, 251-273, at 265. 
52 Akayesu Trial Judgment, paras. 422 and 452. 
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evidence to support that the accused was guilty of rape, as the accused did 
not specifically order the assailants to commit the collateral crime of rape53.  
The prosecution both in Akayesu and Kajalijeli case failed to plea joint 
criminal enterprise in respective indictments and hence, the trial chambers 
have not expressed any opinion on the applicability of the joint criminal 
enterprise to the crime of rape.  
The inclusion of rape and sexual violence as a genocidal act has been 
heavily criticized. The omission of that crime as genocide would ignore the 
use of rape and sexual violence as a tool of humiliation directed against 
victimized groups solely on the grounds of their ethnicity. Akayesu Trial 
Chamber with regard to counts of rape and sexual violence in the indictment 
emphasized: 
Rape and sexual violence …constitute genocide in the same way as any 
other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and 
sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental 
harm on the victim and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the 
worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily 
and mental harm.  
The Trial Chamber succeeded to infer the genocidal context of rape and 
sexual violence towards Tutsi women in the light of presented evidence 
before the Tribunal and respectively concluded:  
In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts 
of rape and sexual violence described above, were committed solely 
against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public 
humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the 
Bureau Communal premises or in other public places, and often by more 
than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological 
destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual 
violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically 
targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and 
to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole54. 
2.4.3 Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part 
Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention prohibits “deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part”. The said paragraph is based on the 
provisions of Secretary-General’s Draft specifying that the crime of 
genocide includes “causing the death of members of a group or injuring 
their health or physical integrity by subjection to conditions of life which by 
                                                 
53 Article 6 (1) and Article 7(1), respectively, of the ICTR and ICTY Statutes. 
54 Akayesu Trial Judgment, paras. 685-695.   
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lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical acre, or 
excessive work or physical exertion are likely to result in the debilitation or 
death of the individuals”55. The Commentary provides “when members of a 
group of human beings are placed in concentration camps where the annual 
death rate is thirty to forty per cent, there can be no doubt that there is 
intention to commit genocide”56. 
On the contrary, Ad hoc Committee’s Draft does not provide the conditions 
‘likely to result in death’. However, it defines that genocide involves 
‘subjecting members of a group to measures or conditions of life aimed at 
causing their deaths’ and thus the conditions do not encompass those that 
are intended to weaken or enfeeble57. 
The Secretariat’s and Ad hoc Committee’s Drafts form the basis of the 
Article adopted by the Sixth Committee recognizing as the genocidal act 
‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part’58. 
The amendment suggested by Uganda to include conditions, which result in 
‘disease or weakening of members of the group’, was rejected59.  
It is necessary to note that the term ‘deliberate’ attached to the aforesaid 
provision was construed to refer rather to intentional creation of conditions 
of life than to intent to destroy a group or groups60. 
The ICTR Trial Chamber in its Akayesu Trial construed the expression 
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part” as “methods of 
destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members 
of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction”61.  
In the light of jurisprudence developed by the ad hoc tribunals, a genocidal 
act of ‘deliberately imposing conditions of life calculated to bring about the 
group’s destruction’ does not require the proof of result. It means that 
intended conditions must be calculated to bring about destruction, however, 
whether they do result or not result in the destruction, lies out of the legal 
framework of genocidal act defined in the said provision. If the destruction 
is actually achieved, the act would be qualified under genocidal acts of 
                                                 
55 Secretary-General’s Comment, supra note 27, art. I (II)(1)(b), at 6. 
56 Secretary-General’s Comment, supra note 27, at 25. 
57 Ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 28, art II (3), at 5 and at 11 (Mr. Maktos) 
58 Sixth Committee Report, supra note 37, art II (c), at 9. See: UN GAOR 6th Comm., 3rd 
Sess., 82 mtg., at 183 (1948) 
59 Ibid. 81st mtg, at 180. 
60 Ibid., 82 mtg, at 182. 
61 Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras. 505-506. Destruction must be material, either physical 
or biological. See also Brdanin Trial Judgment, para. 694, Krstic Appeal Judgement, 
para.25, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth 
Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, UN Doc.A/51/10, pp.90-91. 
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‘killing members of the group’ or ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
one or more persons’ discussed in the previous sub-chapters of the Chapter. 
It is quite interesting to look at the oral arguments of Yugoslavia before the 
ICJ in the case of Yugoslavia v. Belgium where Yugoslavia attempted to 
press genocide charges against NATO states motivating it by the fact of 
“continued bombing of the whole territory of the state, pollution of soil, air 
and water, destroying the economy of the country, contaminating the 
environment which depleted uranium” contributed to causing “conditions of 
life on the Yugoslav nation calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction”62. 
The provision of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” seeks 
to punish methods of destruction apart from direct killings, including, inter 
alia, creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death. 
The jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR have established that such acts as 
the systematic expulsion of members of the group from their homes63, the 
lack of proper housing64, subjection to a subsistence diet65, denial of proper 
clothing, hygiene and medical care66 contribute to the conditions of life 
calculated to bring about physical destruction of a group in whole or in part. 
2.4.4 Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group 
Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention embodies “imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group”. The Secretary-General’s Draft 
provides that the said genocidal act encompasses “restricting births by 
sterilization and/or compulsory abortion, segregation of the sexes or 
obstacles to marriage”67. The Commentary is referring to the ‘biological’ 
genocide that is aimed at the extinction of a group of human beings by 
systematic physical, legal or social restrictions on births without which the 
group cannot survive68. 
Nevertheless, the Ad hoc Committee’s Draft does not refer to the biological 
genocide. It refers to “imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
                                                 
62 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium et al.), Verbatim Record, 10 May 1999 
(Rodoljub Etinski) 
63 Brdanin Trial Judgment, para.691, Prosecutor v.Rutaganda, Judgment and Sentence, 
para.52. Also here, pasted! 
64 Brdanin Trial Judgment, para.691, Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, paras.114-
116. 
65 Brdanin Trial Judgment, para.691, Rutaganda Judgement, para.52 
66 Brdanin Trial Judgment, para.691, Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, paras.114-
116. 
67 Secretary-General’s Comment, supra note 27, art. I (II) (2), at 6. 
68 Ibid., at 26. 
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the group”. This provision is interpreted broadly including castration, 
compulsory abortion and the segregation of sexes.  
The interpretation of the Ad hoc Committee was incorporated into the Sixth 
Committee’s Draft that is comprehensive enough to include sterilization and 
forced abortion.  
Accordingly, the article 4(2)(d) of the ICTY Statute and article 2(2)(d) of 
the ICTR Statute comprise three elements: 
1) measures must be imposed on one or more members of a group; 
2) measures must be imposed intentionally; 
3) measures must be intended to prevent births within the group. 
The ICTR Trial Chamber in its Akayesu Judgment ruled that measures can 
be both physical and mental, including, inter alia, sexual mutilations, 
sterilization, forced birth control, separation of sexes, and prohibition of 
marriages69. The measures need to be intended to prevent births. An 
example of such measures could be forced separation of the males and 
females70.  
Nevertheless, the measures intended to prevent births within a group should 
be interpreted in the light of the historical, social and cultural environment 
of the group. In its Akayesu Judgment, the ICTR Chamber defined rape as a 
measure intended to prevent birth, when “a woman of the group is 
deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have 
her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s 
group”71. 
In the light of the evidentiary circumstances, the ICTR convicted an accused 
of “causing serious bodily and mental harm” but not of “imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group”. It was recognized that the acts 
of rape and sexual violence were committed solely against Tutsi women, 
many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation and thus 
rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women and 
the Tutsi group as a whole72.  
2.4.5 Forcibly transferring children of the group 
to another group 
Article II (e) of the Genocide Convention penalizes “forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group”. The Secretary General’s Draft 
                                                 
69 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 507, Musema Trial Judgment, para. 158, Rutaganda Trial 
Judgment, para 53, Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 117 
70 Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para. 507. 
71 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 507. 
72 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para 731. 
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contains the provision of “destroying the specific characteristics of the 
group by forced transfer of children to another human group”73. The 
Commentary emphasizes that the forced separation of children from their 
parents entails “forcing upon the former at an impressionable and receptive 
age a culture and mentality different from their parents” and as a result, the 
process of separation “tends to bring about the disappearance of the group as 
a cultural unit in a relatively short time”74. 
The Ad hoc Committee’s Draft does not refer the forcible transfer of 
children of the group to another group to the form of physical genocide. 
However, the forcible transfer of children is encompassed within prohibition 
on cultural genocide75. The latter is defined as an act causing the members 
of a group to disappear and abolishing specific traits of the group76.  
The representative of Venezuela during the Sixth Committee proceedings 
reasonably stated that “if the intent of the transfer had been the destruction 
of the group, a crime of genocide would undoubtedly have been 
committed”77. 
The ICTR Chamber expressed its opinion in the Akayesu case that the 
objective of forcibly transferring children of the group to another group is 
“not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to 
sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer 
of children from one group to another”78.  
It is absolutely necessary to mention that none of the accused has been ever 
convicted of the forcible transfer of children by both ad hoc tribunals. 
Antonio Cassesse79 criticized the ICTR for making law beyond the facts 
wisely suggesting that the Court “should refrain from expressing opinions 
which are beside the question actually to be decided”80. 
2.4.6 Is the list of crimes constituting the crime 
of genocide exhaustive? 
The drafters of the Genocide Convention agree on the fact that the list of 
crimes enumerated in the Article II of the Genocide Convention is 
exhaustive but, however, not limited in its scope81. 
                                                 
73 Secretary-General’s Comment, supra note 27, art. I(II)(3)(a), at 6. 
74 Secretary-General’s Comment, supra note 27 at 27. 
75 Ad hoc Committee Report , supra note 28, at 27. 
76 Ibid., Observations at 6-7.  
77 Sixth Committee Report, supra note 37, 82 mtg., at 195.  
78 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para.509. See also: Musema Trial Judgment, para 159, 
Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para. 54; Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 118 
79 Italian jurist, former President of United Nations Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Chairperson for the United Nations Commission of Inquiry for Darfur. 
80 Casesse, Antonio, ‘International Criminal Law’, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
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Rape, torture, forced disappearances can be regarded as the genocidal 
offences if they meet the requirements of, for example, “killing”, “causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members the group” or “imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group”.  
Aforesaid crimes could be regarded sooner or later as the part of 
international customary law as discrete categories of underlying offences82. 
2.5 The mens rea of the crime of genocide 
Mental element or mens rea of the crime of genocide comprises two 
components:  
1) knowledge; 
2) dolus specialis. 
2.5.1 Knowledge 
 
‘Knowledge’ as the constitutive element of mens rea means awareness that 
a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events and thus accused must have knowledge of the circumstances of the 
crime83. The constitutive element ‘knowledge’ provided in the Rome Statute 
is analyzed in the Chapter IV of the work.   
 
Some scholars argue that genocide could be hardly committed by a single 
individual, for this serious international crime requires a particular plan, 
even though the plan is not mentioned as a separate characteristic of the 
crime in the Genocide Convention84.  
 
The practice developed by the ad hoc tribunals supports the aforementioned 
requirement of a plan. In the Jelisic case the opinion was expressed by the 
Trial Chamber that “while it is theoretically possible for genocide to be 
committed by an individual acting in the absence of some more general 
plan, in practice it would be impossible to make proof of such a situation”85. 
The ICTY in its further jurisprudence, in particular, in the Ruling on the 
Sufficiency of Evidence in the case of Karadzic and Mladic, confirms the 
                                                                                                                            
81 N. Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A commentary. New York: Institute of Jewish 
Affairs, 1960, pp. 57, p. 64.  
82 Mettraux, Guenael, International Crimes and the Ad hoc Tribunals, Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 2005 p. 244. 
83 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Art. 30. 
84 Schabas William. Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. See also: Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Laws of 
Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for World Peace, 1944, p. 79. 
85 Jelisic Trial Judgment, para. 655. 
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requirement of a plan as an evidentiary matter, though it is not explicitly 
part of the definition within the framework of the Genocide Convention86. 
 
In Kayishema and Ruzindana, the ICTR ruled that “although a specific plan 
to destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it would appear that it 
is not easy to carry out genocide without a plan or organization”87. 
Moreover, it emphasized that “the existence of such a plan would be strong 
evidence of the specific intent requirement for the crime of genocide”88. 
 
The extent of the knowledge of the details of a plan or a policy to carry out 
the genocide would vary depending on the position of the perpetrator in the 
governmental hierarchy or military command structure. However, a 
subordinate who actually carried the genocidal plan cannot be exempted 
from the responsibility simply because he did not possess the same degree 
of knowledge regarding the overall plan as his superiors89. Though 
individuals do not necessarily need to participate in devising the genocidal 
plan, the mere fact of the commitment of the acts of genocide with 
knowledge of the plan is enough for the requirements of the Genocide 
Convention to be met90. 
 
The accused must have the knowledge of the consequences of his/her act in 
the ordinary course of events and thus if the genocidal act is killing, the 
logical consequence will be death and the accused must be aware that this 
will be the result or at least be reckless to the occurrence of the act in 
general.  
 
In the case of the direct and public indictment to genocide and conspiracy to 
commit genocide, the consequences are not the part of the corpus delicti and 
hence, no proof of knowledge of the consequences is required. 
 
The ICTR in its Akayesu Judgment defined that “the offender is culpable 
because he knew or should have known that the act committed would 
destroy, in whole or in part, a group”. This legal construction of mens rea 
defined by the ICTR is referred often as the indirect intent (dolus eventualis) 
in the criminal law theory.  
International criminal law has adopted the interpretation of the term ‘malice’ 
used at the common law system. However, there is s strong danger of 
misunderstanding and confusion when some categories applied in one or 
another legal system are transferred into the context of international law. In 
most common law jurisdictions, the mens rea requirement of murder is 
                                                 
86 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Consideration of the Indictment within the 
Framework of Rule 61of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, para. 94. 
87 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 94. 
88 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 276. 
89 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 
May – 26 July 1996, note 13 above, p. 90.  
90 UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.4, p. 4. 
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satisfied “where the accused is aware of the likelihood or probability of 
causing death or is reckless as to the causing of death”91. 
The civil law concept of dolus describes the voluntariness of an act and 
incorporates both direct and indirect intention. Under the theory of indirect 
intention (dolus eventualis), should an accused engage in life-endangering 
behavior, his killing is deemed intentional if he ‘makes peace’ with the 
likelihood of death. In many civil law jurisdictions the foreseeability of 
death is relevant and the possibility that death will occur is generally 
sufficient to fulfill the requisite intention to kill92. Currently, the ad hoc 
tribunals are applying the concept of dolus eventualis shifting towards 
reception of some theories developed in the continental legal system. The 
application of the dolus eventualis has been challenged before the ICTY, 
however, the Stakic Appeals Chamber concluded that the application of 
dolus eventualis does not violate the principles of nullum crimen sine lege 
and in dubio pro reo93. The concept of dolus eventualis has potential 
prospects in international criminal law but it is still doubtful whether it 
could be applicable to determine threshold of knowledge towards the crime 
of genocide due to the peculiarity of the mental element of the crime of 
genocide singling it out from war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The degree of knowledge of consequences is a delicate issue and it provided 
a heated debate during the work of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC. 
It was argued by Professor Schabas that the term ‘should have known’ 
usually refers to the crimes of negligence and as a result, it cannot be 
applicable to the crime of genocide. Therefore, the term ‘recklessness’ 
should be differentiated from the term ‘willfulness’, whilst excluding mere 
negligence from its scope94. The opinion of Professor Schabas is very 
reasonable on the inappropriateness of the term ‘should have known’ in 
regard to the crime of genocide, for it is an indicator of dolus eventualis.  
Some scholars argue that criminal knowledge can also be determined in 
cases of so called ‘willful blindness’ that refers to the situation when an 
individual deliberately fails to inquire the consequences of the certain 
behavior and where the person knows that such inquiry should be 
undertaken95. 
                                                 
91 Delalic Trial Judgment, para. 434. 
92 Ibid. 434. 
93 Stakic Appeal Judgment, para. 103. 
94 Supra note 80, p. 212. 
95 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons 
Ltd., 1961, p. 159. 
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2.5.2 Intent (dolus specialis) to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
and religious group 
The crime as a perilous illegal to society act is an organic combination of 
interrelated and interdependent elements of a crime (actus reus and mens 
rea). To constitute the crime of genocide, an act must necessarily be 
comprised of the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial and religious group, as such. This very specific requirement of the 
crime of genocide distinguishes it from war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Even if committed act appears to have all the attributes of the 
crime of genocide but the intent is absent, the accused cannot be charged 
with the crime of genocide and thus this act even resulting in the destruction 
of the group does not meet the specific intent requirement. Nevertheless, the 
act will remain punishable being qualified either as the crime against 
humanity or a crime under domestic criminal law. 
The formulation of the crime of genocide in the Genocide Convention 
clearly shows that the genocide is a crime of intent. Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention provides a clear description of the intent, namely, “to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as 
such”. The reference to the intent means that the prosecution must go 
beyond the reasonable doubt establishing that the offender suffices requisite 
mental state. 
Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Roman-
continental legal systems. It is absolutely required as a constitutive element 
of certain offences and demands that the perpetrator has the clear intent to 
cause the offence charged96. Akayesu Trial Chamber referred to various 
academic works while devising special intent in the international criminal 
law and it showed its adherence to the approach defining special intent as a 
key element of an intentional offence characterized by a psychological 
relationship between the physical result and the mental state of the 
perpetrator97. 
By its terms, the required “intent to destroy, in whole or in a part, a national, 
ethnical, racial and religious group”, as such requires three specific 
components: 
1) degree or quality of the requisite mental state; 
2) scope of the requisite mental state; 
3) the term ‘in whole or in part’. 
                                                 
96 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 518 
97 See: Roger Merle et André Vitu, ”Traité de droit criminel”, Cujas, 1984, (first edition, 
1967), p.723 et seg. 
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2.5.2.1 Degree or quality of the requisite mental state 
The approach taken towards the degree or quality of the requisite mental 
state applied by the ICTY in the Krstic case is a good standpoint for the 
evaluation of the culpability of a perpetrator for a crime of genocide. The 
Trial Chamber in its Krstic case consents that a definition of genocidal 
intent encompasses acts “committed with the goal of destroying all or part 
of the group”98. However, following the argument of the Krstic Trial 
Chamber, the goal of destruction of a group rather might be formulated at 
some later point during the implementation of a military operation whose 
primary objective was totally unrelated to the fate of the group and thus 
genocidal acts need not to be premeditated over a long period99.  
2.5.2.2 Scope of the requisite mental state: “a … 
group, as such” 
Both ad hoc tribunals in their Trial Judgments in Krstic100, Akayesu101, and 
Kayishema and Ruzindana102 have adopted the interpretation of a ‘group as 
such’, set forth in the ILC Draft Code of Crimes: 
The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of 
massive criminal conduct. […] the intention must be to destroy the group 
‘as such’, meaning as separate and distinct entity103. 
There are four types of victimized groups, namely national, ethnical, racial 
or religious groups. As it is defined by the ICTR “a national group is a 
collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on 
common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties”104.  
An ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose members share a 
common language or culture105.  
The conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary 
physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of 
linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors106.  
The religious group is one whose members share the same religion, 
denomination or mode of worship107.  
                                                 
98 Krstic Trial Judgment, para. 571. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Krstic Trial Judgment, para. 552. 
101 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 522. 
102 Kayishema and Ruzindana Trial Judgment, para. 99. 
103 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, 1996, at 88. 
104 Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 512. 
105 Ibid., para. 513. 
106 Ibid., para. 514. 
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However, the discretion to construe what exactly constitutes a particular 
group is given to the court. The ICTR Akayesu Trial Chamber explored that 
issue in depth looking back to the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention and it ruled that “the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived 
as targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and 
membership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more 
‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, 
such as political and economic groups”108. 
The important legal characteristic of the crime of genocide is that “the 
victim is chosen not because of his individual identity, but rather on account 
of his membership of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group … [it] 
means that the victim of the crime of genocide is the group itself and not 
only the individual109. 
Krstic110 and Jelisic111 Trial Judgments emphasize that the element 
pertaining to group ‘as such’ makes genocide an exceptionally grave crime, 
which is distinct from other serious crimes – such as persecution – where 
the perpetrator selects his victims because of their membership in a specific 
community, but does not necessarily seek to destroy the community as a 
distinct entity. The same position is reaffirmed in the Stakic Appeals 
Chamber defining that the term ‘as such’ has a great significance, for it 
shows that the offense requires intent to destroy a collection of people who 
have a particular group identity112. 
2.5.2.3 The term ‘in whole or in part’ 
A perpetrator of genocide does not necessarily need to seek the destruction 
of the entire group. In order to determine the proportion of a targeted group 
intended to be destroyed constituting the requirement ‘in part’, it is of vital 
importance to consider such criteria as the scope or geographical expansion 
of the group and the perpetrator’s subjective perception of the nature of the 
targeted group as a distinct entity. The ICTY and ICTR elaborated on the 
situation when a part of the group could be perceived as a distinct entity 
being concentrated within a limited geographic area in Jelisic113 and 
Akayesu114 Trial Judgments. The said approach was reaffirmed in the Krstic 
Trial Judgment where the Trial Chamber construed that: “the killing of all 
members of the part of a group located within a small geographical area, 
although resulting in a lesser number of victims, would qualify as genocide 
                                                 
108 Ibid.,, para. 511. 
109 Nehemiah Robinson, "The Genocide Convention. Its Origins as Interpretation", 1950, 
p.15.  
110 Krstic Trial Judgment, para. 553. 
111 Jelisic Trial Judgment, para. 79. 
112 Stakic Appeal Judgment, para. 20. 
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if carried out with the intent to destroy the part of the group as such located 
in this small geographical area”115.  
The ICTY Trial Chamber in its Krstic Judgment contributed significantly to 
the interpretation of the definition of genocide by defining boundaries of 
mens rea. The issues arising in the Krstic case are of great importance. The 
first issue concerns whether ‘the protected group’ within the meaning of the 
definition of genocide is constituted of ‘Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica’ or 
Bosnian Muslims as a group in general? The Chamber construed that the 
group of Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica and Bosnian Muslims constituted 
group protected under the Genocide Convention. The intent to destroy a 
group living in particular geographical area could be regarded as the crime 
of genocide because “the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy 
the entire group, they must view the part of the group they wish to destroy 
as a distinct entity which must be eliminated as such”116. 
 
Therefore, the total context of the physical destruction should be taken into 
account. There could be several outcomes in regard to the qualification of a 
crime of genocide: 
 
● If a killing campaign takes place in different places in a 
broad geographical area, it cannot be qualified as a genocide 
because the campaign itself does not show the intent of the 
perpetrators to target the very existence of the group as such; 
 
● If a killing campaign takes place against the members of a 
group living in a relatively small geographical area, it could be 
qualified as a genocide if carried out with the genocidal intent. 
 
The second raised question is whether the genocidal intent suffices in the 
situation where only men of military age are killed. The Chamber holds the 
opinion that the selective destruction of the group would have a lasting 
impact on the entire population. It is also stated in the Judgment that “the 
killings of the men of military age were executed, while the rest of Bosnian 
Muslims population was subjected to the forcible transfer”117. Furthermore, 
the Bosnian Serbs knew that the combination of the killings with the 
forcible transfer would result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian 
Muslims population of Srebrenica. 
In a sum, the term ‘in part’ could be construed in the sociological context of 
the targeted group. The Jelisic Trial Chamber found out that intent could be 
regarded as genocidal if it seeks to destroy “the most representative 
members of the targeted community”118.  
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The intent of the perpetrator to destroy a particular group ‘in whole or in 
part’ must be distinguished from the destruction directed against the whole 
population. Genocide and extermination are two distinct crimes falling 
under different categories; genocide targets a particular group while the 
extermination targets the whole population. The requisite specific intent to 
destroy a national, ethnical, racial and religious group must be proven 
beyond the reasonable doubt to qualify the crime of genocide. 
2.5.2.4 Means to infer the requisite intent 
The specific intent (dolus specialis) of genocide is the necessary constituent 
element of mens rea of the crime of genocide. However, it is extremely 
difficult to prove dolus specialis in certain cases and as a matter of practical 
necessity, specific intent of the crime of genocide may be inferred from 
certain facts and circumstances, including inter alia, the general context of 
the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that 
same group, and whether or not those acts were committed by the accused 
or by others, the scale of atrocities committed etc119. 
The Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana endorsed the approach as 
follows:12   
Regarding the requisite intent the Trial Chamber acknowledges that it may 
be difficult to find explicit manifestations of intent by the perpetrators.  
The perpetrator’s actions, including circumstantial evidence, however may 
provide sufficient evidence of intent. 
The Appeals Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana re-affirmed the Trial 
Chamber’s approach:  
As noted by the Trial Chamber, explicit manifestations of criminal intent 
are, for obvious reasons, often rare in the context of criminal trials. In order 
to prevent perpetrators from escaping convictions simply because such 
manifestations are absent, the requisite intent may normally be inferred from 
relevant facts and circumstances. 121 
The Commission of Experts in the Final Report on the Situation in Rwanda, 
noting the practical necessity of inferring specific intent, suggested that the 
requisite specific intent could be inferred from sufficient facts, such as the 
number of victims from the group122. 
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The ad hoc tribunals have determined that the specific intent for genocide 
may be inferred from facts such as: 
(i) the seriousness of discriminatory acts;12 
(ii) the gravity of the ‘ethnic cleansing’;12 
(iii) the general political doctrine giving  rise to the acts;12   
(iv) acts which violate or which the perpetrators themselves 
consider to violate the very foundation of the group;12 
(v) the destruction or attacks on cultural and religious property 
and symbols of the targeted group;12 
(vi) destruction or attacks on houses belonging to members of 
the group;12 
(vii) the desired destruction of a more limited number of persons 
selected for the impact that their disappearance would have 
on the survival of the group as such which would constitute 
an intention to destroy the group “selectively”;129 
(viii) the perpetration of other acts systematically directed 
against the same group,1 whether these acts were 
committed by the same offender or by others;11 
(ix) the scale of atrocities committed, their general and 
widespread nature, in a region or a country;12  
(x) systematically targeting victims on account of their 
membership of a particular group while excluding the 
members of other groups;1   
(xi) the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts;1 
(xii) the existence of a plan or policy;1 
(xiii) the scale of the actual or attempted destruction;1 
(xiv) the methodical way of planning the killings;1   
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(xv) the systematic manner of killing1 and disposal of 
bodies;19 
(xvi) the discriminatory nature of the acts;1 
(xvii) the discriminatory intent of the accused;11 
(xviii) all acts or utterances of the accused,12 in particular the use 
of derogatory language towards members of the targeted 
group;1 
(xix) a pattern of purposeful action;1 and 
(xx) the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury.1 
The aforementioned list of facts is not exhaustive and other facts can be 
adjudicated as those assisting to infer the requisite intent.   
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3 Other acts of genocide 
3.1 Conspiracy to commit genocide 
Conspiracy to commit genocide is recognized as a distinct crime under the 
Genocide Convention146, the ICTY147, and ICTR148 Statutes. The peculiarity 
of the crime is that it could be committed only collectively, as it requires 
minimum two offenders. Common law and civil law apply different 
standards towards the concept of conspiracy. 
 
Common law approaches the aforementioned concept in a way that the 
agreement of two or more persons to commit a crime of genocide will 
constitute committed conspiracy. The consequences of the crime are out of 
the legal framework of the crime. The crime is committed upon the 
agreement of two or more persons, even if the crime itself has not been 
carried out149.  
The civil (continental) law system approaches the concept of conspiracy in 
another way, defining conspiracy as the form of participation in the crime 
itself and recognizing it punishable to the extent the crime is committed150. 
3.1.1 Drafting history 
The discussion on the conspiracy rests on the legacy of the Nuremberg trial. 
The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal penalized conspiracy under Article 
6 of the Charter. The judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal were of opinion that 
the wording of the Article 6 did not add a new and separate crime for those 
already listed, but was simply designed to establish the responsibility of 
persons participating in a common plan151. 
 
“Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation 
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing”152 were recognized as punishable acts under the Charter of the 
IMT. 
 
                                                 
146 Art. III (b) 
147 Art. 4 (3) (b) 
148 Art. 2(3)(b) 
149 Musema Trial Judgment has been a crucial case while defining the crime of conspiracy  
to commit genocide. The Chamber summarized existing approaches towards the crime both 
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Judgment, paras.  184-198.  
150 Ibid. 
151 Yearbook of the ILC 1986, volume 2, part I, [hereinafter Yearbook], para. 122. 
152 Charter of the IMT, 1951, 82 UNTS 279, Art. 6 (a) 
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American and British trials on the administration of the Nazi concentration 
camps also added to the interpretation of the scope of liability for 
conspiracy. In the Dachau Concentration Trial153, forty accused were 
convicted of having actively and knowingly participated in a common 
enterprise to abuse, starve, torture and murder the inmates of the camp.  
 
Having construed the Charter of International Military Tribunal, in 
particular, Article 6 of the Charter; the Tribunal came to the conclusion that 
conspiracy cannot stand as an autonomous crime. Furthermore, the Tribunal 
set aside the charge of conspiracy for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and retained it only for crimes against peace154. In other words, 
the tribunal regarded it solely as a crime of responsible government 
officials, for a crime against peace can be committed only by such 
officials155.  
 
In accepting the concept of conspiracy only for crimes against peace and 
rejecting it for war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal accepted only the ‘complot’ aspect of the concept of conspiracy. 
 
In fact, where crimes against peace are concerned as defined by the 
Nuremberg Charter, the agents who are responsible governmental officials 
could be held responsible linked to each other by their joint action. By the 
nature, they are co-perpetrators but not accomplices, and their action may be 
seen as a plot against the external security156. 
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal outlined the concept of conspiracy very broadly: 
 
The conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not 
be too far removed from the time of decision or action. The planning, to be 
criminal, must not rest merely on the declarations of a party programme, 
such as are found in the twenty-five points of the Nazi Party, announced in 
1920, or the political affirmations expressed in “Mein Kampf” in later 
years. The tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan to wage war 
existed, and determine the participants in that concrete plan.  
 
 
However, it is complicated to determine whether conspiracy is related closer 
to the concept of ‘complot’ or concept of complicity.  
 
Conspiracy encompasses the notion of complicity when the plan is executed 
within an organization involving hierarchical relations between the leaders 
and the actual perpetrators, for complicity in this case may operate between 
leaders and subordinates157.  
 
                                                 
153 The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-Nine 
Others (1949), XI Law Reports.  
154 See:  France et la v. Goering, 1946, 22 IMT 203, p. 469. 
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The Nuremberg Tribunal recognized a criminal organization as a form of 
conspiracy defining that “a criminal organization is analogous to a criminal 
conspiracy in the essence of both cooperation for criminal purposes”158. 
There must be a group bound together and organized for a common purpose. 
The group must be formed or used in connection with the commission of 
crimes denounced by the Charter. 
 
Nevertheless, the membership in the organization is insufficient to prove the 
conspiracy. It is of great importance to determine the threshold of existing 
‘knowledge’. If the members do not possess the knowledge of the criminal 
purposes or acts of the organization, they cannot be found guilty of 
conspiracy159. 
3.1.2 Developed case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals 
Although the Genocide Convention specifically recognizes conspiracy to 
commit genocide as a distinct crime, various interpretation problems arise 
when they involve concepts whose limits are not clearly determined. 
Complicity and conspiracy are undoubtedly different at the conceptual level, 
but there is always a certain degree of complicity among the members of a 
conspiracy.  
According to the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, both Tribunals have the power to 
prosecute persons charged with the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide. 
The crime of conspiracy to commit genocide was incorporated from the 
Genocide Convention. None of the accused has been ever convicted of 
conspiracy to commit genocide in the ICTY160, while it has been charged 
several times in the ICTR161.  
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The ICTR Chamber in its Musema Trial Judgment tried to show the 
differences between the concept of conspiracy used in the common law 
system and civil law system. It deliberated that “common law systems tend 
to view “entente” or conspiracy as a specific form of criminal participation, 
punishable in itself”162.  On the contrary, under the civil law system 
conspiracy or ‘complot’ derogates from the principle that a person cannot be 
punished for mere criminal intent (‘resolution criminelle’) or for preparatory 
acts committed. Complot is punishable only where its purpose to commit 
certain crimes considered as extremely serious, in particular, undermining 
the security of the state163.  
With respect to the constitutive elements of the crime of conspiracy, the 
ICTR is in favor of the common law doctrine of conspiracy. As it is 
summarized by the ICTR, the crime of conspiracy is committed when two 
or more persons agree to a common objective, the objective being criminal 
under the common law system164.  
Under civil law, there are two existing levels of ‘complot’ or conspiracy 
based on the level of gravity of a crime. The first level concerns simple 
conspiracy and the second level conspiracy followed by material acts. 
Simply conspiracy is usually defined as a concerted agreement to act, 
decided upon by two or more persons while the conspiracy followed by 
preparatory acts is an aggravated form of conspiracy where the concerted 
agreement to act is followed by preparatory acts. However, both forms of 
complot require: 1) an agreement; 2) concerted wills; 3) common goal to 
achieve substantive offence165. 
The ICTR admitted that the constitutive elements of conspiracy as defined 
under both legal systems, are very similar and the Court defines it as an 
agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime of genocide166. 
Regarding the mens rea of the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide, it 
rests on the concerted intent to commit genocide that is intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. Hence, 
in the view of the ICTR Chamber in Musema Judgment, the “requisite intent 
for the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide is ipso facto, the intent 
required for the crime of genocide, that is dolus specialis of genocide”167. 
The Court underlines that both under civil and common law systems, 
conspiracy is an inchoate offence (‘infraction formelle’) which is punishable 
by virtue of the criminal act as such and not as a consequence of the result 
of that act. The crime of conspiracy to commit genocide is punishable, even 
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if it fails to produce a result, even if the substantive offence has not actually 
been perpetrated168. 
The important issue has been raised by the ICTR whether an accused could 
be convicted of both genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide. There 
are various approaches regarding the qualification of the crime of 
conspiracy under civil and common law systems. 
Under civil law system, if the conspiracy is successful and the crime has 
been committed, the accused will be convicted only of the substantive 
offence but not of conspiracy. Once the substantive offence has been 
accomplished, there is no reason to punish accused for his/her mere 
resolution criminelle (criminal intent), or even for the preparatory acts 
committed in furtherance of the substantive offence. Therefore, an accused 
can only be convicted of conspiracy if the substantive crime has not been 
realized or if accused was part of a conspiracy, which has been perpetrated 
by his/her co-conspirators, without his/her direct participation169.  
Under the common law system, an accused can, in principle, be convicted of 
both conspiracy and a substantive crime, in particular, where the objective 
of the conspiracy extends beyond the offences actually committed. 
In Musema Judgment the Court adopted the definition of conspiracy where 
accused cannot be convicted of both genocide and conspiracy to commit 
genocide on the basis of the same acts. This judgment is in line with the 
intention of the Genocide Convention. Travaux preparatoires of the 
Convention show that conspiracy to commit genocide was included to 
punish the acts that did not constitute genocide. The implication of that is 
that no purpose would be served in convicting an accused if he/she has been 
found guilty of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide170. 
On the other hand, in Kambanda case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber 
convicted the accused of both genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide 
and allowed the defendant’s sentence to incorporate both crimes171.  
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3.2 Direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide 
Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is recognized as a separate 
crime under Article II (II)(2) of the Genocide Convention, Article 4(3)(c) of 
the ICTY Statute and Article 2(3)(c) of the ICTR Statute.  
3.2.1 Drafting history 
The Secretary General’s Draft prohibits “direct public incitement to any act 
of genocide, whether the incitement be successful or not”172. The Ad hoc 
Committee’s Draft defines the crime in the same terms penalizing “direct 
incitement in public or in private to commit genocide whether such 
incitement be successful or not”173. 
The Sixth Committee incorporated the provision of the Secretary General’s 
Draft penalizing “direct and public incitement to commit genocide”174. The 
terms ‘or in private’ and ‘whether such incitement was successful or not’ 
were excluded. However, the exclusion of the term ‘whether such 
incitement was successful or not’ was criticized. Mr. Bartos, the 
representative of the Former Yugoslavia reasonably noted that “the first step 
in the campaign against genocide would be to prevent incitement to the 
crime”175. Mr. Morozov of the USSR supported his point of view 
questioning “how the inciters and organizers of the crime could be allowed 
to escape punishment, when they were the ones really responsible for the 
atrocities committed”176. On the other hand, Mr. Maktos, the representative 
of the USA, opposed the prohibition of the crime of incitement to genocide 
stating that “incitement may be punishable, in many instances, as an attempt 
or an overt act of conspiracy to commit genocide”177.  
The scope of incitement under the Genocide Convention could be illustrated 
by the trial of Julius Streicher178. An accused being one of the first members 
of the Nationalist Socialist Party and publisher of an anti-Semitic weekly in 
Nazi Germany was convicted of the crimes against humanity by the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Taking into account 
Streicher’s provocation of hatred against Jews, the Tribunal concluded that 
“Streicher’s incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews 
in the East were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly 
constituted persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with 
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war crimes, as defined by the Charter, and a crime against humanity”179. 
However, the Genocide Convention does not require the incitement to 
genocide to be connected with war crimes or crimes against peace and thus 
incitement to exterminate a racial, religious, ethnic or national group would 
constitute a violation of Article III (c)180. 
The International Law Commission while working on the Draft Code of 
Crimes discussed whether the crime of incitement to genocide should have 
been recognized as a distinct crime. After all the discussions held within the 
International Law Commission, latter penalized a general offense of direct 
and public incitement applicable to all crimes in the Draft Code of Crimes. 
The Commission defined that “the incitement is punishable only when the 
crime in fact occurs”181. Making the incitement dependant upon the 
occurrence of the crime, the International Law Commission created the 
confusion between the concepts of ‘aiding’ related to the complicity in 
genocide and the crime of incitement per se.  
3.2.2 Developed case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals 
The ad hoc tribunals penalize direct and public incitement to genocide. 
Nevertheless, nobody has been indicted by the Prosecutor of the ICTY for 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The ICTR has several 
indictments charging with the direct and public incitement. Jean-Paul 
Akayesu and Jean Kambanda were convicted of the crime of the incitement 
to commit genocide. 
The ICTR conducted a comparative legal analysis in regard to the crime of 
incitement. Under the common law, incitement is defined as encouraging or 
persuading another to commit an offense182. Under civil law system, 
incitement could be defined as an act intended to directly provoke another to 
commit a crime or misdemeanour through speeches, shouting or threats, or 
any other means of audiovisual communication183. 
The ICTR deliberated on the ‘public’ and ‘direct’ elements of incitement. 
The ICTR defines that the ‘public’ element of incitement to commit 
genocide may be appreciated in the light of two factors: the place where the 
incitement occurred and whether or not assistance was selective or 
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limited184. Under civil law system, words could be regarded public whether 
they are spoken aloud in a place that they were public by definition185.  
The ‘direct’ element of incitement implies a direct form specifically 
provoking another to engage in a criminal act186. The Chamber holds the 
opinion that the ‘direct’ element of incitement should be viewed in the light 
of its cultural and linguistic content187. Indeed, a particular speech may be 
perceived as ‘direct’ in one country, and not so in another, depending on the 
audience. 
Based on all arguments used both in civil law system and common law 
system, the Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that incitement could be 
defined as “directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, 
whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at 
public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or 
display of written material or printed matter in public places or at public 
gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, or through 
any other means of audiovisual communication”188.  
The dilemma before the Trial Chamber was whether the crime of direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide could be punished even where such 
incitement was unsuccessful. Though the Genocide Convention did not 
explicitly provide the consequences of incitement, the Trial Chamber 
concluded “genocide clearly falls within the category of crimes so serious 
that direct and public incitement to commit such a crime must be punished 
as such, even where such incitement failed to produce the result expected by 
the perpetrator”189.  
In regard to mens rea of the crime, the crime of incitement to commit 
genocide must be intentional. As the Trial Chamber ruled in its Akayesu 
case “mens rea required for the crime of direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide lies in the intent to directly prompt or provoke another to 
commit genocide and it implies a desire on the part of the perpetrator to 
create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary to commit such a 
crime in the minds of the person(s) he is so engaging”190. The person who is 
inciting to commit genocide must be in possession of dolus specialis, 
namely, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
and religious group, as such.  
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3.3 Attempt to commit genocide 
Article III (d) of the Genocide Convention penalizes any “attempt to commit 
genocide”. The original provision on the crime was amalgamated in the 
Secretary-General’s Draft191 and later incorporated in the Ad hoc 
Committee’s Draft192. The same provision on the attempt to commit 
genocide was unanimously adopted by the Sixth Committee193.  
The Draft Code of Crimes contains a general provision on the attempt to 
commit a crime applicable to all crimes, including the crime of genocide:  
“an individual shall be responsible for a crime of genocide if that individual 
attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the 
execution of a crime which does not in fact occur because of circumstances 
independent of his intentions”194. 
Attempt to commit genocide is enlisted as a punishable act under the 
ICTY195 and ICTR196 Statutes. However, there is no case law on the attempt 
to commit genocide because there has never been prosecution for an 
attempted genocide.  
The difficulty in interpretation of an attempt lies in the fact that domestic 
law in regard to the concept of an attempt to commit a crime varies greatly. 
It appears problematic to draw a clear borderline when a preparatory act to 
commit a crime becomes punishable. Almost all legal systems require that 
“attempt must involve something going beyond mere preparation and 
showing the beginning of execution of the crime”197.  
3.4 Complicity in genocide 
Nearly all criminal law systems recognize complicity as a punishable act 
and thus those who aid, abet, procure or otherwise participate in criminal 
offences should bear the criminal responsibility for the latter, even though 
they did not act as principal perpetrators of the crime. Many concepts 
applied in domestic criminal law have been embedded into international 
criminal law, and the concept of complicity is not an exception of a rule. 
Such a transposition of certain concepts could result in the ambiguity and 
incoherence and sometimes the meaning of concepts applied in international 
law could change substantially from those applied in domestic criminal law 
systems. 
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3.4.1 Drafting history 
Complicity in the most serious violations of international humanitarian law 
was recognized as a crime in the “Nuremberg Principles”, formulated by 
the ILC, defining that: “Complicity in the commission of a crime against 
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity is a crime under 
international law”198. 
 
Though International Military Tribunals recognized the complicity as a 
separate crime under the international law, the Tribunals took the limited 
content approach to the interpretation of the concept of complicity. Article 6 
of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter singled out 
“leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices”199 separating accomplices 
from leaders, organizers and even instigators.  
 
The provision of the Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council establishes 
the criminal responsibility of a person who: 
 
a) was a principal; 
b) was an accessory to the commission of a crime or ordered or abetted the same; 
c) took a consenting part therein; 
d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving the commission of a crime; 
e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the commission of a crime; 
f) with the reference to paragraph 1 (a), i.e. crimes against peace, held a high political, civil 
or military position or a high position in financial, industrial or economic life200. 
 
The language provided both in Nuremberg Charter and Law No. 10 of the 
Allied Control Council appears to be very vague and the question remains 
of what an accomplice is if he is not the instigator or the person, who 
ordered, directed, organized, or took a consenting part in the crime. Does 
complicity include only aiding and abetting or the provision of means as 
those acts were clearly referred to in the aforementioned legal provisions?201 
 
It appears that the “drafters of the text were concerned primarily for the 
principle of efficiency”202 and tried to criminalize all acts possible not to let 
any act remain unpunished. The principle of legal rationality was left aside 
and hence, many synonymous and overlapping terms are found in the 
respective texts. 
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In time where the crime had taken the most varied and insidious forms, the 
group crime prevailed and it was extremely difficult to separate accomplices 
from all those who participated in the mass action. 
 
Therefore, the respective texts have limited substantially the content of the 
complicity by distinguishing various forms of participation autonomously.  
 
GA in its Resolution 96 (I) reaffirms that genocide is a crime under 
international law for “the commission of which principles and accomplices” 
are to be punished203.  
 
The General-Secretariat’s Draft penalizes “willful participation in acts of 
genocide of whatever description”204 encompassing both principals and 
accessories205. The Drafts of the Genocide Convention submitted by 
different countries including, inter alia, USA, Soviet Union, China and 
France contained the provisions penalizing the complicity in genocide.  
 
U.S draft defined that “it shall be unlawful and punishable to commit 
genocide or to willfully participate in an act of the genocide”206. Soviet 
Draft referred that “Convention should establish the penal character on 
equal terms with genocide of deliberated participation in genocide in all its 
forms and complicity or other forms of conspiracy for the commission of 
genocide”207. France and China expressed themselves strongly in favor of 
including complicity reaffirming that “principals and accomplices shall be 
punishable for the commission of the crime of genocide”208. 
 
The Ad hoc Committee’s Draft prohibits “complicity in any of the acts 
enumerated in this article”209. Originally, the Ad hoc Committee’s Draft 
penalized “conspiracy or any other form of complicity conducing to the 
commission of genocide”210. However, the phrase “or any other form of 
complicity” was removed from the draft text. The representative of the USA 
recognized that “in agreeing to the conclusion of ‘complicity’, he 
understood it to refer to accessoryship before and after the fact and to aiding 
and abetting in the commission of crimes enumerated in the article”211. 
 
The Sixth Committee adopted the definition proposed by the Ad hoc 
Committee slightly modifying it to “complicity in any act of genocide”212. 
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Despite extensive recognition of the crime of complicity as a punishable act 
under international criminal law, many issues were evolved on the nature of 
the complicity per se. It was noted that complicity entailed “the rendering of 
accessory or secondary aid, or simply of facilities, to the perpetrator of an 
offence and thus accomplices were punished only if the crimes were 
actually committed”213. The Representative of Venezuela approached the 
problem from a different angle by arguing that “complicity should apply 
equally to acts carried out before the crime was committed and to those 
performed subsequently, to acts assisting the culprits to escape the 
punishment they deserved”214. 
 
The centerpiece of complicity is the provision of assistance or 
encouragement with the intent that such aid is used to commit a criminal 
offence215. A good example of complicity could be illustrated by Zyklon B 
case, where Bruno Tesch was convicted and sentenced to death by a British 
Military Court216. The evidence presented before the Court was enough to 
prove that Bruno Tesch was the accessory to war crimes committed by Nazi. 
Being the owner of a firm, the accused supplied two tons of gas to 
Auschwitz every month, though he had knowledge that the gas was used for 
mass extermination217. In contrast, the U.S war crimes tribunal acquitted 
German industrialists in the absence of necessary threshold of knowledge 
ruling that “neither volume of production nor the fact that large shipments 
were destined to concentration camps would alone be sufficient to lead us to 
conclude that those who knew of such facts must also have had knowledge 
of the criminal purposes to which this substance was being put”218. 
 
Accessory liability could also take place when an individual intentionally 
assists another to avoid apprehension or punishment or when a 
governmental official knowingly fails to fulfill a duty to intervene, to halt or 
to punish criminal activity219. The Tokyo Criminal Tribunal found Foreign 
Minister Koki Hirota guilty in the atrocities committed during so-called 
‘Rape of Nanking’, for he “was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the 
cabinet that immediate action be taken to put end to the atrocities, failing 
any other action open to him to bring about the same result” and 
consequently, “his inaction amounted to criminal negligence”220. 
 
The ILC Draft Code of Crimes defines that an individual shall be punishable 
for the crime of genocide if an individual: 
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b) orders the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; 
c) fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime in the circumstances set out in 
Article 6; 
d) knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly or substantially, in the commission of 
such a crime, including providing the means for its commission; 
e) directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact 
occurs; 
f) directly and publicly incited another to commit such a crime which in fact occurs…221 
 
The definition of the complicity provided in the ILC Draft is too vague and 
ambiguous. The Commentary of the ILC Draft shows that the Commission 
did not understand the term ‘abetting’222. 
 
Although the ILC concluded that “complicity could include aiding, abetting 
or assisting ex post facto, if this assistance had been agreed upon by the 
perpetrator and the accomplice prior to the perpetration of a crime”, the 
Commission’s provision is of a contradictory nature. The term ‘abetting’ 
enlisted in paragraph (d) includes inciting, instigating or encouraging the 
commission of a crime itself. However, the paragraph (f) defines the 
incitement as set above and thus the ILC code codified extensive number of 
acts constituting the crime of complicity that overlap in different sections. 
Hence, the obsessive codification resulted in the “mechanistic application of 
the nullum crimen sine lege principle”223. 
 
The ILC Draft Code draws legal findings on mens rea of complicity from 
the Nuremberg trial and customary law, and concludes that “an accused may 
be found culpable if it proved that he intentionally commits such a crime”, 
or “he knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly or substantially, in 
the commission of such a crime”224. 
 
The commentary to the ILC Draft Code states that “accomplice must 
knowingly provide assistance to the perpetrator”. The Commentary clarified 
on the important issues providing that an individual cannot be held 
accountable if he provides some type of assistance to another individual 
without knowing that this assistance will facilitate the commission of a 
crime”225.  
 
The interpretation of the words ‘directly’ and ‘substantially’ was provided 
in order to qualify the degree of contribution to the commission of a crime.  
 
The commentary explains that “an accomplice must provide the kind of 
assistance which contributes directly and substantially to the commission of 
the crime, for example by providing means which enable the perpetrator to 
commit a crime”. Hence, the form of participation of an accomplice must 
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entail assistance which facilitates the commission of a crime in some 
significant way”226. 
 
Even though the commentary does not clearly define what is ‘substantially’, 
the substantial contribution requirement calls for a contribution that in fact 
has an effect on the commission of the crime. A good example of the 
‘substantial’ contribution could be the supplies of poison gas in the Zyklon B  
case that was used for the purpose of mass exterminations. 
 
The accused is found criminally culpable for any conduct where he/she 
knowingly participated in the commission of an offence violating 
international humanitarian law and his/her participation directly and 
substantially affected the commission of a criminal offence through 
supporting the actual commission before, during or after the incident. 
 
The concept of complicity has been developed in a different dimension in 
the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. Both instruments have incorporated the 
definition provided in the article III (e) of the Genocide Convention of the 
substantive genocide provision. In addition, both Statutes contain a general 
complicity provision that is applicable to all offences falling under 
tribunals’ subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
The criminal liability applies to persons who have “planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime within the tribunal’s jurisdiction”227. 
3.4.2 Elements of complicity 
There are three recognized basic requirements for establishment of the guilt 
of an accomplice. 
 
First, the crime must have been committed. As it was ruled in Jelisic case, 
complicity requires proof that the underlying or predicate crime has been 
committed by another person228. Nevertheless, the principal offender does 
not necessarily need to be charged or convicted in order of the liability of an 
accomplice to be established229. 
 
Secondly, there must be a material act (actus reus) by which the accomplice 
actually contributes to the perpetration of the crime. However, the degree of 
the participation remains a debated issue. It appears that the ICTY endorsed 
the approach proposed by the International Law Commission requiring that 
the assistance should be substantial. In Tadic case, the Trial Chamber ruled 
that participation could be considered being substantial if “the criminal act 
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most probably would not have occurred in the same way had not someone 
acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed”230. 
 
Thirdly, mens rea of the accomplice should be defined, for the accomplice’s 
act must be carried out with intent and knowledge of the perpetrator’s act. 
The Trial Chamber in the Tadic case stated that “there is a requirement of 
intent, which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a 
conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, 
committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a 
crime”231. 
3.4.3 Forms of complicity  
Forms of complicity are discussed in the following sub-sections showing 
distinctions between various forms of secondary participation and problems 
of practical application in the case law.   
 
3.4.3.1 Planning 
 
It was recognized by the ICTR in its Akayesu judgment that “planning 
within the meaning of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals is only criminal if 
the underlying crime is committed”232. The ICTR indicated problematic 
issues while applying the law. Planning is very similar to the notion of 
complicity in civil law system or conspiracy under common law system. 
The difference lies in the fact that one person can commit planning, unlike 
complicity of plotting. Taking into consideration, the ICTR ruled that 
planning could be defined as “implying that one or several persons 
contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the preparatory 
and execution phases”233. 
 
Guenael Mettraux recognizes the approach to the planning provided by the 
ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu case as the one “to be based on a 
misunderstanding as to the required degree of realization of the offence of 
‘planning’. His arguments are based on the fact that “planning constitutes in 
most legal systems, an inchoate crime and it is realized and complete, once 
all of its elements are met, without being a need for the offence planned to 
have been committed”234. It is difficult, however, to suggest which motives 
were behind the aforesaid legal finding of the Court. 
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The level of the participation should be substantial, such as it was defined in 
Bagilishema Trial Judgment “formulating as criminal plan or endorsing a 
plan proposed by another”235. 
 
Concerning the mental element of ‘planning’, an accused must in addition 
be shown to have possessed the required intent for the underlying offence in 
question, that he/she directly or indirectly intended that the crime in 
question be committed236.  
 
The ICTY ruled that an individual may be found responsible for the 
commission of the crime and not, apparently, for its planning and thus it 
means that an accused cannot be convicted both of planning and execution 
of the crime that has been planned237.  
 
3.4.3.2 Instigating 
 
According to the practice of both ad hoc tribunals, instigation involves 
“prompting another to commit an offence if his actions are shown to have 
been causal to the actual commission of the crime”238. Instigation is 
synonymous with the term ‘incitement’239 used and widely applied in 
English law. The ICTR recognized that instigation in the light of criminal 
participation differs from “direct and public incitement”, for latter 
constitutes a distinct crime, but not a form of complicity. Instigation does 
not need to be ‘public’ or ‘direct’ in the sense those terms are applied to 
“direct and public incitement to commit genocide”240. Incitement to commit 
a crime is some form of inducement, encouragement, or persuasion to 
perpetrate the crime.  
 
The legal findings of the ICTR rest on the fact that instigation constitutes 
complicity only when it is accompanied by “gifts, promises, threats, abuse 
of authority or power, machinations or culpable artifice”241. In sum, unless 
the instigation is accompanied by one of aforesaid elements, the mere fact of 
prompting another to commit a crime does not constitute the complicity, 
even if the person committed the crime as a result. 
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The instigator must be shown to have possessed the requisite criminal 
intent; in particular, “he directly or indirectly intended that the crime in 
question be committed”242. 
 
3.4.3.3 Ordering 
 
Ordering is a form of complicity through instructions given to the direct 
perpetrator of an offence. As it was defined in the Krstic Trial Judgment 
“ordering entails a person in a position of authority using that position to 
convince another to commit an offence”243. 
 
The order may be given either implicitly, or explicitly and the fact of its 
existence may be established circumstantially244. 
 
The ICTY Chamber in its Blaskic Trial Judgment held the opinion that “the 
order does not need to be illegal in general on its face to engage the 
responsibility of the person who has issued it, nor it has to be given directly 
or personally to the individual who issued it to be criminally responsible”245.  
 
Regarding mens rea of ordering, what really matters is the state of mind of 
the person giving the order, not that of the person who is obeying it. 
 
The ad hoc tribunals have not expressed their point of view whether an 
illegal order to commit a crime could be regarded as criminal, even though 
the order was not carried out. 
 
3.4.3.4 Aiding and abetting 
 
The form of complicity involving aiding and abetting refers rather to the 
concept developed by the common law system. According to the 
jurisprudence developed by the ICTR, aiding means giving assistance to 
someone, while abetting involves facilitating and commission of an act 
being sympathetic thereto246. The Tribunal declared that it is sufficient to 
prove one or other form of participation and thus aiding and abetting are two 
disjunctive terms247. 
 
The ICTY construed aforementioned problem in a different manner treating 
aiding and abetting as if they had a collective meaning. The Court did not 
offer distinct meaning for both terms defining in Tadic case that “aiding and 
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abetting included all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend 
encouragement or support, as long as the requisite intent is present”248. 
 
In Furundzija case, the Trial Chamber holds that  “actus reus of aiding and 
abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of a crime”249. 
 
A person may participate in a crime without sharing the criminal intent of 
the principal intent of the perpetrator; therefore, the mental element of the 
crime rests on the accessory knowledge that “his actions assist the 
perpetrator in the commission of the crime”250. 
 
3.4.3.5 Co-perpetrator or aider (abettor) to genocide?  
 
The general concept of complicity has been analyzed in previous sub-
chapters for better understanding of applicability of the concept specifically 
to the crime of genocide. A range of judgments with regard to genocide was 
produced by the ICTY and ICTR. The first case dealing with genocide in 
Srebrenica (Krstic case) was a remarkable milestone for the subsequent 
cases on genocide. The Krstic Trial and Appeals Chambers clarified on 
important aspects of complicity in genocide.   
 
The Trial Chamber held the opinion that Krstic was a co-perpetrator of 
genocide in its Judgment. Nevertheless, in its Appeal Judgment, the Court 
partially overturned the previous ruling and recognized Krstic as aider 
(abettor) to genocide251. The analysis of rendered decisions in Krstic case is 
provided in this sub-chapter to illustrate practical challenges while 
convicting the person either of co-perpetration in genocide or aiding 
(abetting) to genocide.  
 
In the Appeals Chamber it was argued by the defense that Radislav Krstic 
could not do anything to prevail upon General Mladic and stop the 
executions252. 
 
Based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber concluded that Radislav Krstic 
had knowledge of the genocidal intent of the VRS Main Stuff members253. 
 
The findings of the Chamber rested on the facts that Krstic was aware that 
VRS main staff had insufficient resources without the use of the Drina 
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Corps resources and as a result the Main Staff would have not been able to 
carry out the executions on the large scale and implement its genocidal plan.  
 
The conclusion of the ICTY Chamber was that Krstic was aware that he 
would substantially contribute to the commission of a crime, namely, 
execution of Bosnian Muslim prisoners if he allowed using the resources of 
Drina Corps254. 
 
The Appeals Chamber overruled the Trial Judgment by arguing that Krstic 
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and execution of genocide 
against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. 
 
Based on the factual examination, the Appeals Chamber stated that: 
 
● there was no evidence that Krstic ordered any of the murders 
of Bosnian Muslims; 
 
● there was no evidence that he directly participated in 
aforesaid murders; 
 
● he knew that those murders were occurring; 
 
● he permitted the Main Staff to use personnel and resources 
under his command. 
 
Hence, Krstic was recognized as an aider and abettor to murders, 
extermination and persecution, but not as a principle co-perpetrator of 
genocide255. 
 
The Court clarifies also on mens rea of the crime defining that a defendant 
may be convicted for having aided and abetted a crime, which requires 
specific intent, even where the principal perpetrators have not been tried or 
identified. This conclusion was drawn in the light of previous judgments, 
namely, Krnojelac Trial Judgment256 where the accused was found liable for 
having aided and abetted the crime of persecution, which required the 
specific intent to discriminate, where the principal perpetrators of the crime 
were not identified, and Stakic Trial Judgment, where the Court defined that 
“an individual can be prosecuted for complicity even where the perpetrator 
has not been tried”257. 
3.4.4 Mens rea of the complicity in genocide 
Should an accomplice to genocide possess dolus specialis, namely intent to 
destroy in whole or in part a national, racial, ethnical or religious group as 
such, to be found complicit in genocide? This question concerning the 
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presence of genocidal intent when a person assists in the commission of the 
crime is still open.  
 
In general terms, the ICTY Trial Chamber in its Tadic case recognized that a 
requirement of intent “involves awareness of the act of participation coupled 
with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating, ordering, 
committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a 
crime”258. 
 
Drawing the conclusion from a general complicity provision, an accomplice 
to genocide must possess dolus specialis. However, jurisprudence of the ad 
hoc tribunals tend to show different requirements for the mens rea standard 
taking into account the form of complicity in genocide.  
 
In contrast, the ICTR Trial Chamber stated that “an accomplice to genocide 
does not necessarily possess the dolus specialis of genocide, namely the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group as such”259. In its Akayesu Judgment the ICTR concluded 
that in order for an accused to be found guilty of complicity in genocide, it 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of genocide has, 
indeed, been committed260. The confusion evolves whether to undertake the 
approach provided by the Akayesu Trial Judgment considering only the 
knowledge of the circumstances but ignoring dolus specialis requirement. 
 
In a sum, the intent of an accomplice to genocide is not identical to that of a 
principal perpetrator. Nevertheless, an accomplice shares genocidal intent if 
he/she is aware of the principal perpetrator’s dolus specialis, namely the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such.  
 
3.4.5 Other forms of criminal participation 
3.4.5.1 Joint Criminal Enterprise 
 
The concept of the JCE was originally developed in the jurisprudence of 
post Second World War military tribunals and commissions. In addition to 
the theory of accomplice liability while prosecuting and convicting Nazi 
supporters, the new concept of criminal liability evolved of “acting with a 
common design”.  
 
The JCE is a sui generis concept that combines elements of common law 
and continental system. It is difficult to assess to which extend the JCE is 
closer to the accomplice liability than to the co-perpetration. Attempts to 
look at the JCE as a separate concept developed in international criminal 
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law and to analyze said concept on the basis of its applicability to the crime 
of genocide in international criminal law are given in this sub-chapter. 
 
The ‘group crime concept’ rests on the theory of English common law. 
Originally the concept of common design liability was interpreted in the 
Nuremberg Tribunal as one that required proof of awareness on the part of 
the defendant (mens rea) that in some way his/her conduct contributed to 
the crime (actus reus)261. Nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary to 
distinguish accomplice liability from the common design liability. As it was 
discussed in the previous sub-chapters on the complicity, accomplice must 
have substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. On the 
contrary, common design liability requires lower degree of participation and 
hence, it is not necessarily substantial. Furthermore, there is no distinction 
to be made between the perpetrator and the accomplice as all individuals 
involved in the commission of the crime are considered to be participants of 
a crime. 
 
The concept of the JCE has been applied actively in the ICTY having a 
significant impact on the jurisprudence of the ICTR. Nevertheless, the scope 
of the JCE is still uncertain and the JCE liability along with its application 
towards the crime of genocide remains as contentious as undetermined”262.  
 
The JCE articulates a mode of individual criminal responsibility, in which 
the acts of one person can give rise to criminal culpability of another where 
both participate in a common criminal plan263.  
 
The JCE encompasses three distinct categories of crime, namely: 
 
● a basic form (First Category JCE); 
 
● a systematic form (Second category JCE); 
 
● an extended form of common purpose (Third Category 
JCE). 
 
The first category requires a plurality of persons that must be involved in the 
commission of a crime264. However, said persons do not need to be 
organized in a military, political or administrative structure265.  
 
The second category requires the existence of a common purpose, which 
amounts to or involves the commission of the crime per se. The purpose 
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could be materialized extemporaneously. It also may be inferred from the 
fact that a plurality of persons is acting together in order to put into effect a 
joint criminal enterprise266. The plan of a joint criminal enterprise can be 
agreed upon at the early stages or it can be developed through the acts 
performed by the persons involved. The objective of a joint criminal 
enterprise can possibly escalate over time267.  
 
The last but not least category of the JCE encompasses the participation of 
an accused in the common design involving the perpetration of a crime. 
However, such participation does not necessarily involve the commission of 
the crime per se, but may include, inter alia, assistance in, or contribution 
to, the execution of the common plan or purpose268.  
3.4.5.1.1 Mens rea of the JCE 
The first and the second categories of the JCE require “an intention to 
participate in and further the criminal activity or purpose of the group”269. 
This provision can be interpreted in a way that all participants must possess 
the same intent. A contrario, the third category of the JCE in regard to mens 
rea differs substantially from the first and the second categories. A 
participant can be held responsible for the crimes falling outside the 
framework of the JCE provided that he/she is in possession of dolus 
eventualis and it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by 
one or another member of the group and the accused willingly took the 
risk.270  
 
To illustrate the application of the JCE in the international criminal law, one 
can mention Tadic case. The Trial Chamber ruled that the accused could not 
be sentenced for the killing of five men in the village of Jaskici since there 
was no evidence that he had taken part in these killings271. Nevertheless, the 
Appeals Chamber partially overturned the judgment of the Trial Chamber in 
this part, and convicted Tadic for those killings relying on the concept of the 
JCE. The third category of the JCE was applied in Tadic case for the 
accused shared the intent to remove people from Jaskici and consequently, 
perpetration of killings was considered as the predictable consequence of the 
removal. 
 
The judges of the Appeals Chamber were very reasonable in the judgment, 
as it was obvious that the accomplice liability could not have been applied 
to Tadic. It was impossible to prove beyond the reasonable doubt that the 
accused “specifically directed at assisting, encouraging or lending moral 
support to the killings while the support must have had a substantial effect 
on the underlying crime”. 
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3.4.5.1.2 Genocidal intent and the JCE 
As it was ruled by the ICTR in its Akayesu case “special intent of a crime is 
the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which 
demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged”272. 
This approach applied to the dolus specialis is known as the purpose-based 
interpretation273. 
 
The interpretation was challenged by the OTP of the ICTY274 and the new 
approach to the genocidal intent was proposed known as the ‘knowledge-
based interpretation’275. It is argued that genocide should encompass acts 
that one knows lead to the destruction of the group, or whose foreseeable or 
probable consequence is the destruction of the group. The current approach 
used by the ad hoc tribunals relies on the purpose-based approach.  
 
The advantage of applying the concept of dolus specialis to the JCE lies in 
the fact that the lower dolus specialis standard is applied but the direct link 
with the actual perpetrators should be proved in any case. On the one hand, 
it seems that the concept of the JCE should be applicable to the ‘intellectual 
perpetrators’ where there is not enough proof of a full genocidal intent and 
the person cannot be convicted of the incitement or conspiracy to commit 
genocide276. On the other hand, it may be problematic to prove the direct 
link with the actual perpetrators. 
 
In a sum, an accused can be held liable for genocide while applying the 
concept of the JCE, when his/her knowledge extends to: the genocidal act 
and principal’s genocidal intent. It can be construed that a participant must 
have knowledge of the genocidal intent and he/she willingly takes the risk 
that such intent may possibly materialize. 
 
3.4.5.2 Command responsibility and genocide 
 
Originally, the concept of command responsibility developed in a military 
context was applied solely to war crimes. The concept was expanded to 
genocide and war crimes in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.   
 
In this sub-chapter the applicability of the concept of command 
responsibility towards the crime of genocide is explored along with 
problems in extending command responsibility to the crime of genocide that 
necessarily entails dolus specialis requirement.   
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Command responsibility is a form of criminal participation when a person in 
a hierarchically responsible position can be held liable for the acts of 
subordinates. In the case of direct command responsibility, a superior 
should be regarded liable as an accomplice, for he/she ordered, instigated or 
planned the criminal acts committed by his subordinates and failed to take 
measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of his/her subordinates. 
Another category of command responsibility defined as so-called imputed 
responsibility is set out in Article 7 (3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6(3) 
of the ICTR Statute when a superior knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit crimes or had done so and the superior 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or 
to punish the perpetrators thereof.  
 
Primarily, the focus is made on the concept of the indirect command 
responsibility due to the fact that the applicability of the complicity to the 
crime of genocide has been discussed in the previous paragraphs.  
 
Drawing the elements of the command responsibility from Article 7(3) and 
6(3) of the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, the essential elements are as follows: 
 
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused and the 
perpetrator of the offence;  
the accused knew or had reason to know that the perpetrator was about to commit 
the offence or had done so; and  
the accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
offence or to punish the perpetrator.2 
3.4.5.2.1 Superior-subordinate relationship 
To determine whether a person held superior authority over the perpetrator 
is necessary to establish the very existence of ‘effective control’2.  In the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals effective control is defined as “the 
material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offences.”29  
The persons under temporary command of the superior are regarded as 
subordinates if “at the time when the acts charged in the indictment were 
committed, these persons were under the effective control of that particular 
individual.”2 The Celebici Trial Chamber ruled that criminal 
responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute could be attributed: “(…) on 
the basis of either their de facto or their de jure positions as superiors.  The 
mere absence of formal legal authority to control the actions of subordinates 
should not be understood to preclude the imposition of such 
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responsibility.”21 It is important to emphasize that the term ‘superior’ is 
not limited to commanders who are directly superior to the perpetrators 
within the regular chain of command; rather a ‘superior’ is defined to relate 
to any person who exercises effective control over subordinates.22 
3.4.5.2.2 Knowledge and Intent 
It must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a superior “knew or had 
reason to know that a subordinate was about to commit a prohibited act or 
had done so.”2  The mental state requirement can be met either by actual 
knowledge, i.e., ‘actual notice’, or by ‘notice of the risk of such 
offences’,2 i.e., ‘inquiry notice’. Actual knowledge is “defined as the 
awareness that the relevant crimes were committed or were about to be 
committed,”2 and can be established through either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.2  
 
The peculiarity of the crime of genocide is in the presence of dolus specialis 
being necessary constituent of mens rea and distinguishing the crime of 
genocide from war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ‘knowledge’ 
element does not suffice requisite mental state in regard to the crime of 
genocide. The way command responsibility is outlined in both Statutes 
clearly refers command responsibility to the crime of negligence. One can 
just wonder how such a specific intent crime as genocide can be committed 
by negligence.   
 
Applicability of the concept of command responsibility as a form of 
criminal participation is not contemplated in any legal instrument with 
regard to the crime of genocide. Nevertheless, the ICTR has applied 
command responsibility towards the crime of genocide in its judgements. In 
Akayesu case the ICTR Trial Chamber acquitted the accused on command 
responsibility charges of the indictment due to the absence of clear superior-
subordinate relationship287. In the Serushago case the ICTR convicted the 
accused pursuant Article 6 (3). The indications in the judgment were clear 
enough to convict the accused of being an accomplice pursuant Article 6 
(1), for “he gave orders to execute several victims”288. Similarly, the 
motivations of the Court were vague and inconsistent in the Kayishema and 
Ruzindana case where the accused was found guilty of command 
responsibility genocide, only after the Trial Chamber had acknowledged that 
he had planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, perpetration or execution of the crimes289. The 
concept of command responsibility will show its efficiency in future 
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genocide cases only when the accused is found guilty due to the fact that he 
‘had reason to know’ about predicate crime.  
 
Although command responsibility has been applied in genocide cases, the 
ad hoc tribunals did not expresses their opinion on the mens rea standard 
with regard to dolus specialis. The ICTY has just attempted to approach said 
problem in Rule 61 Hearing in Karadzic and Mladic290. It is reasonably 
argued by William Schabas that in the case of command responsibility, the 
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the genocidal intent of the 
subordinate, not that of the commander. If the commander’s genocidal intent 
is established than complicity is a proper basis of guilt rather than command 
responsibility291. 
3.4.5.2.3 Necessary and reasonable measures 
A superior must take ‘necessary and reasonable measures’ to meet his/her 
obligation to prevent offences or punish offenders under Article 7(3) of the 
ICTY Statute and Article 6 (3) of the ICTR Statute.  The adequacy of these 
measures is commensurate with the material ability of a superior to prevent 
or punish.292 
 
The Trial Chamber should consider ‘actual ability or effective capacity’ of 
the superior to take action, rather than his/her legal or formal authority.29  
“A superior is not obliged to perform the impossible. However, the superior 
has a duty to exercise the powers he has within the confines of those 
limitations.”29  The duty to prevent or to punish “includes at least an 
obligation to investigate the crimes to establish the facts and to report them 
to the competent authorities, if the superior does not have the power to 
sanction himself.”29  Whether the superior’s effort to prevent or punish the 
crimes committed by subordinates reaches the level of ‘necessary and 
reasonable measures’ is at the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate 
taking into account the facts of the particular case.29  
 
It is difficult to predict the prospects of applicability of the concept of 
command responsibility towards the crime of genocide when the boundaries 
of knowledge and specific intent are not clearly defined in the jurisprudence 
of the ad hoc tribunals.  
 
                                                 
290 Rule 61 : Orders for Review of the Indictments/ Article 61 : Ordonnances aux Fins de 
l'Examen des Actes d'Accusation, Cases No IT-95-5-R61 & No IT-95-18-R61. 
291 Supra note 80, at 312. 
292 Blaskic Trial Judgement, para.335; Celebici Trial Judgement, para.395. 
293 Kordic Trial Judgement, para.443; see also Blaskic Trial Judgement, para.335; Celebici 
Trial Judgement, para.395; Bla{ki} Appeal Judgment, para.72. 
294 Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para.95. 
295 Kordic Trial Judgement, para.446; see also, Blaskic Trial Judgement, para.302, 335. 
296 Celebici Trial Judgement, para.394. See also Kvocka Trial Judgement, para.316. 
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4 The impact of the developed 
concept of the crime of 
genocide in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals on the ICC practice 
4.1 The crime of genocide in the Rome 
Statute and ICC Elements of Crimes297 
 
The concept of establishment of the permanent international criminal court 
has been debated by the international community for many years. However, 
the implementation of such an idea involved considerable efforts of the 
international community. Why did it take such a long time to create the 
permanent institution of criminal jurisdiction aimed to achieve the global 
justice? 
 
The idea of global justice was finally achieved with the adoption of the 
Rome Statute at the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court held in Rome in July 
1998. Although the establishment of the ICC “marked an important 
milestone in the quest for an international criminal justice system”298, the 
important questions remain to what extent the system could be self-
sustaining and how it would be able to harmonize existing and developing 
international criminal law. 
 
The key element of the international criminal justice system that operates 
under the Rome Statute is the principle of complementarity. The Court 
exercises its jurisdiction only when a member state to the Rome statute is 
unable or unwilling to carry out an investigation or prosecution299. 
Comparing to the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC does not have primacy over 
domestic courts while applying its jurisdiction and it is aimed merely to 
supplement domestic proceedings.  
 
The states drafting the Rome Statute agreed that the crime of genocide 
needed to be absolutely included within the jurisdiction of the Court as the 
                                                 
297 See: Aksar, Yusuf, ‘Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From the Ad hoc 
Tribunals to a Permanent International Criminal Court’, Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, London & New York, 2004. 
298 Selected Basic Documents Related to the International Criminal Court (ICC 
Publication, 2005). 
299 Rome Statute, Article 17(1)(a). 
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Rome Statute itself aimed that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished”300.  
 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute is verbatim article II of the Genocide 
Convention. Of regret is the fact that the article III of the Genocide 
Convention has not found its reflection in any provision of the Rome Statute 
and hence, conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity in regard to the 
crime of genocide have not been taken into account. 
 
Different explanations could be offered on the exclusion of aforesaid terms 
in the text of the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, the general provisions on 
incitement301, attempt302 and complicity303 are provided in the Rome Statute 
and consequently, they could be applied to all criminal offences enlisted in 
the Rome Statute.  
 
The first genocide cases have been tried before the ad hoc tribunals and thus 
the ICC cannot undermine their role in the development of the substantial 
body of international criminal law. The ICC will definitely rely upon the 
practice developed by the ad hoc tribunals as latter not only applied the 
elements of the crime of genocide, but also clarified the substantive content 
of the crime of genocide. 
 
The Elements of the ICC304 elaborate on the definition of the crimes 
enumerated in the Rome Statute defining actus reus, mens rea and 
providing both general and specific introduction to the elements of the 
crime. The Elements give detailed description of each of five genocidal acts 
enumerated in the Rome Statute. In the introductory part to the crime of 
genocide, it is defined that mental element towards the crime of genocide 
will be decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis305. 
 
While drafting the Elements, the delegates of the Preparatory Commission 
looked in depth at the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. Akayesu case 
was a pivotal case with regard to the conviction for the crime of genocide 
being recognized by the former UN Secretary-General as a “landmark 
decision bringing to life, for the first, the ideals of the Genocide Convention, 
adopted 50 years ago”306. The decisions rendered by the ad hoc tribunals are 
crucial in terms of providing guidance on the elements of genocide and the 
ICC as the court of the ‘last resort’ will play an important role in further 
application of the legal provisions on the crime of genocide. 
 
                                                 
300 Rome Statute, Preamble. 
301 Rome Statute, Article 25 (3) (e). 
302 Rome Statute, Article 25 (3) (f). 
303 Rome Statute, Article 25 (3) (d). 
304 ICC Elements of Crimes adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, 3-10 Sep 2002, 
Official records, ICC-ASP/1/3. 
305 Ibid.,  Introduction, Art. 6. 
306 Statement by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the Occasion of the Announcement 
of the First Judgment in a Case of Genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, UN Doc. PR/10/98/UNIC, 1998.  
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The ad hoc tribunals have been working with the skeletal definitions of 
crimes. The judges are in discretion to develop and construe necessary 
elements of the crime. A contrario, another approach prevails towards the 
ICC as latter has a broad jurisdiction over all states parties that are 
signatories to the Rome Statute and hence, it is in the interest of states 
parties to construct a fully-fledged system when all the crimes are defined in 
the precise terms. How precise the definitions of crimes should be? This 
question was debatable in the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court. The delegates of the Committee 
compromised and recognized that the definitions of crimes in the Rome 
Statute were ones to be applied and the Court had a reasonable discretion in 
the interpretation. Moreover, the binding force of the Rome Statute and the 
Elements is not equal. The ICC Elements of Crimes are meant to be 
necessary guidelines for the judges to apply the provisions of the Rome 
Statute. Elements must be consistent with the Rome Statute and in the case 
of inconsistency according to Article 9 (3) the Statute should prevail.  
 
The state parties to the Rome Statute tried to establish a fully-fledged 
system of criminal law through clear and specific definitions of the elements 
of crimes. In spite of compromises and consensus achieved on some 
important theoretical issues, the question still remains to what extent 
aforesaid ‘fully-fledged system’ could be effective and applicable in 
practice. 
4.2 Protected Groups and the Rome 
Statute  
The very first requirement of the crime of genocide is that the genocidal acts 
must be directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 
Although these groups are mentioned in such international instruments as 
the Genocide Convention, the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, Rome 
Statute, the definitions of the groups are not provided. The discretion has 
been given to the ad hoc tribunals to interpret the definition of targeted 
groups and in fact, the ICTR clearly defined the interpretation applicable to 
the concepts of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups in Akayesu, 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, and Rutaganda Judgments. As the interpretation 
of the targeted groups developed by the ad hoc tribunals is consistent with 
the international law, it seems that the ICC would take the same approach to 
the concepts of protected groups that are not limited only to national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group but encompass also any groups as long as they are 
stable and permanent.  
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4.3 Actus reus of the crime of genocide in 
the Rome Statute and ICC Elements of 
Crimes 
The second requirement is met if the crime of genocide must is constituted 
of acts enumerated in the Genocide Convention, ICTY and ICTR Statutes, 
or Rome Statute. The ad hoc tribunals have contributed significantly to the 
interpretation of the constitutive genocidal acts and the ICC would 
definitely work with respective jurisprudence developed by the tribunals. 
Though the list of acts constituting genocide is exhaustive, however, it is not 
limited in its scope, for example, the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
recognized the crime of rape and sexual violence as the genocidal act under 
the categories of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of 
the group” and “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group”.  
 
The concept of genocide developed in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals was taken as a basis while drafting the Rome Statute, ICC 
Elements of Crimes and thus many innovative developments found the 
direct reflection in the text of the Statute and Elements.  
4.3.1 Genocide by killing in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes 
This work analyzes how the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals with 
regard to the acts constituting the crime of genocide has influenced the 
contents of the Rome Statute along with the ICC Elements of Crimes and 
how it would possibly influence the further practice of the ICC. 
 
“Killing members of the group” is one of the most obvious acts constituting 
the crime of genocide and the world community witnessed killings taken 
place in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. There has been enough evidence 
presented before the ICTY and ICTR that such killings took place and the 
process of identification of missing persons is still ongoing. As it was 
interpreted in Akayesu judgment ‘killing’ as the genocidal act must be 
committed against one or several individuals because such individual or 
individuals were members of a specific group, and specifically because they 
belonged to this group307, the same approach was followed in the 
Elements308. The Genocide Convention provides that genocide constitutes 
“killing of members of the group”309 and thus the term ‘members’ is used in 
plural and cannot be applicable to one person. The important question arises 
as whether the definition has been broadened while applied in the ad hoc 
tribunals and adopted by the Elements. Is the interpretation provided in the 
Akayesu case consistent with the definition in the Genocide Convention and 
                                                 
307 See: Chapter I, 2.4.1 Killing members of a group. 
308 ICC Elements of Crimes, Elements, Art. 6(a). 
309 Genocide Convention, Art. II (a). 
 64
customary law? Killing as a genocidal act must be approached from the 
angle of individual criminal responsibility. If the individual, with necessary 
mens rea, agrees with 999 others that they will carry out one killing each – 
and each does it, surely, then each of them should be guilty of genocide 
rather than simple murder310. Professor Schabas reasonably argues that “the 
killing of one member of the protected group would support a count of 
genocide, provided the killing was done with the genocidal intent”311. 
 
In the ICC Elements of Crimes killing as the genocidal act takes place when 
such criteria are met: 
 
1. the perpetrator killed one or more persons; 
2. such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group; 
3. the perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such; 
3. the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction312.  
 
The paragraph 4 defines that the act of perpetrator needs to take place “in 
the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against the 
group” and it appears to be inconsistent with the Genocide Convention and 
Rome Statute itself for it slightly expands the definition of genocide. The 
inclusion of this element to the ICC Elements of Crimes was motivated by 
the fact that such an element was absolutely needed as it could capture 
adequately the notion of the scale or threat to a group required to amount to 
the genocide.  
 
The introductory part of the Elements construes the contextual element 
requirement. The term ‘in the context of’ as defined includes ‘initial acts in 
an emerging pattern’313 providing that at the initial stage of the commission 
of the crime perpetrators can be charged and convicted of the crime of 
genocide. The term ‘manifest’ is an objective qualification used to avoid 
referring to the isolated crimes committed over long period of time.  
 
It is still questionable whether the inclusion of the contextual element 
requirement was absolutely necessary. Anyway, it is hard to imagine that 
the Office of the Prosecutor would ever charge a person or persons with the 
crime of genocide in the absence of a genocidal context. The applicability of 
this provision in the further ICC practice is equivocal. However, it is 
difficult to assess the role of provided element until the genocide case is 
actually brought on trial to the ICC. 
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It is of vital importance that the ICC Elements of Crimes recognize killing 
of one person as the genocidal act not requiring the destruction to be 
‘substantial’. The horrific crime of genocide should be halted in progress 
until the destruction becomes ‘substantial’. It is absolutely needful that 
genocide must be prevented in future bearing in mind enormous suffering of 
victims of genocide in the past. 
4.3.2 Genocide by causing serious bodily or 
mental harm in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes 
The approach taken by the ICC in its Elements of Crimes towards 
constitutive act of genocide “causing serious bodily or mental harm” is 
reflecting the interpretation of said genocidal act in the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc tribunals. The interpretation of rape and sexual violence as genocidal 
acts under the category of  “causing serious bodily and mental harm” firstly 
developed by the ICTR in Akayesu and further by the ICTY in Krstic was 
reaffirmed in the Elements and hence, the further ICC practice would be 
consistent with current developments in international criminal law.  
4.3.3 Genocide by deliberately inflicting 
conditions of life calculated to bring about 
physical destruction and the ICC 
Elements 
The genocidal act of “deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to 
bring about physical destruction” in the ICC Elements of Crimes is in line 
with the developed case law of the ad hoc tribunals. The ICTR provided the 
methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill 
the members of the group but which seeks for their physical destruction. 
The ICC Elements of Crimes recognize that ‘conditions of life’ to bring 
about the physical destruction may include deprivation of resources 
indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic 
expulsion from homes314. Provided list is neither exhaustive nor limited in 
its scope and the ICC judges are authorized to evaluate, which conditions of 
life contribute to the physical destruction.  
4.3.4 Genocide by imposing measures intended 
to prevent births and ICC Elements 
The main achievements of the ad hoc tribunals are inclusion of rape into the 
category of “imposing measures to prevent births” and recognition of the 
measures not only of physical but also of mental character. The ICC 
Elements of Crimes do not determine which specific measures constitute 
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this genocidal act315. Nevertheless, the approach taken by the ad hoc 
tribunals has a precedential value for the ICC. 
4.3.5 Genocide by forcibly transferring children 
in the ICC Elements 
Another important interpretation of the ICTR in its Akayesu and Rutaganda 
Judgments in regard to such a genocidal act as “forcibly transferring 
children” is reflected in the text of the Elements as well. The ICTR in its 
Rutaganda judgment concluded that the term ‘forcibly’ was not restricted 
only to physical violence, but it also included acts of threats of trauma 
which would lead to the forcible transfer of children316 and hence, the ICC 
in its Elements reinforced the approach stating that the term ‘forcibly’ may 
include, along with physical force, threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment317. 
4.4 Intent 
The very specific requirement of the crime of genocide distinguishing it 
from war crimes and crimes against humanity is the presence of dolus 
specialis, namely the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group. The ad hoc tribunals have contributed significantly 
to the clarification of dolus specialis applicable to the crime of genocide 
showing interrelation of ‘intent to destroy’ and ‘in whole or in part’ in 
regard to a protected group, differentiating genocidal intent from 
discriminatory intent of the crime of persecution falling under the category 
of crimes against humanity, and clarifying on circumstances when the 
genocidal intent could be inferred from a number of facts.   
 
Mens rea of the crimes falling under the ICC jurisdiction is encompassed in 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute: 
1.         Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.  
   
2.         For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
(a)     In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b)     In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or 
is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
                                                 
315 ICC Elements of Crimes , Art. 6(d). 
316 Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para.54. 
317 ICC Elements of Crimes, Elements, Art. 6(e). 
 67
How does the general provision on mens rea in the Rome Statute apply to 
the crime of genocide? Taking into consideration the peculiarity of the 
crime of genocide that requires dolus specialis, it appears unreasonable to 
apply general mens rea criterion requirement provided in Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute. Hence, the special intent is only subject to Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute. In this case, more specific provision applies to the crime of 
genocide rather than default rule set in Article 30 of the Statute318. 
Obviously, the Rome Statute failed to address properly the mens rea 
requirement for the crime of genocide. There is no explicit answer in the 
Statute whether the general and specific intent should be considered 
separately or jointly.  
The legal approach to the crime of genocide should be cured of its 
shortcomings; thus, drawing clear boundaries of mens rea of the crime of 
genocide is the priority task for the ICC to avoid confusion in possible 
future genocide cases.  
4.5 Other acts of genocide and the ICC 
Under the ICTY319 and ICTR320 Statutes, a person can be held responsible 
for conspiracy to commit genocide. There is no clear provision neither in the 
Genocide Convention, nor in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes what is the 
definition of the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide, and consequently, 
the ad hoc tribunals have been in discretion to construe this term.  
 
In the light of the spirit and purpose of the Genocide Convention, 
conspiracy to commit genocide could be understood as an agreement 
between two or more persons to commit genocide. The existence of a mere 
agreement is sufficient to convict a person of a crime of genocide 
irrespective of the occurrence of the crime of genocide itself321. Inclusion of 
the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide is aimed at the prevention of 
the crime of genocide as it can be clearly inferred from the full name of the 
Convention that its purpose is not only to punish individuals for the crime of 
genocide but also to prevent the occurrence of said horrific crime as the 
priority task. The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals are consistent with the 
interpretation of the concept of conspiracy in the Genocide Convention. 
However, the developed jurisprudence is ambiguous, inasmuch as it still 
remains unclear which approach towards the conspiracy to commit genocide 
should prevail – applicable in common law system or continental law 
system.  
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Conspiracy is not punishable under the Rome Statute, as majority of the 
civil law countries present at the Rome Diplomatic Conference did not 
express themselves in favor of including the concept of conspiracy to the 
text of the Rome Statute. 
 
Antonio Cassese holds the opinion that the Rome Statute is out of line with 
international customary law322 as the exclusion of the conspiracy to commit 
genocide is falling out of the scope of the Rome Statute.  
 
The Rome Statute is a major step backward due to the exclusion of the 
conspiracy to commit genocide and thus one of the most preventive tools of 
the occurrence of the crime of genocide was totally ignored by the 
international community. Despite that lacuna in the text of the Rome 
Statute, the further practice of the ICC will show whether the Court can 
ignore totally the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and developed 
concepts of international criminal law that have become the part of 
international customary law.  
 
The concept of direct and public incitement to commit genocide constitutes 
a crime under both Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. The ICTR has greatly 
contributed to the interpretation of the crime. The definition of the crime 
provided by the ICTR creates guidance for international community. The 
ICTR has clearly construed mens rea of the crime defining the ‘intent to 
directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide’ and solved out the 
issue whether the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
is punishable if the incitement is not successful323. The Tribunal took the 
same approach as towards conspiracy to commit genocide making the 
incitement punishable due to the serious gravity of the crime of genocide as 
such. 
 
The view taken by the ad hoc tribunals complies with the spirit and purpose 
of the Genocide Convention, for the prevention of the occurrence of the 
crime of genocide is an important issue facing the entire international 
community. The ICC could not ignore the developed jurisprudence of the ad 
hoc tribunals and the crime of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide took explicitly its place in the Rome Statute324. Undoubtedly, the 
ICC will consider the jurisprudence developed by the ad hoc tribunals in 
regard to the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide in its 
further case law.   
 
The Genocide Convention and ad hoc tribunals singled out an attempt to 
commit genocide as a distinct crime showing a significant difference 
between an attempt to commit genocide and an attempt to commit any other 
crime. Of regret is the fact that the ICC ignored that interpretation defining 
the concept of attempt applicable to all crimes. A person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
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the ICC if the person attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that 
commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime did 
not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intention325. 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute states that a person who abandons the effort 
to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall 
not be liable for punishment for the attempt to commit the crime if that 
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose326. 
Undoubtedly, as far as such a serious crime as genocide is concerned, said 
provision should not be applicable even if the person completely and 
voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose to commit genocide. Nevertheless, 
it could be considered as a mitigating factor in defining the sentence to be 
imposed but not the factor excluding the criminal responsibility. In this 
sense, the Rome Statute is definitely step backward and one can just wonder 
how such important interpretations developed by the ad hoc tribunals could 
have been ignored while drafting and adopting the Rome Statute. 
 
Complicity in genocide has provoked many heated debates in the ad hoc 
tribunals and perhaps remains the most controversial concept in 
international criminal law. As the definition of complicity is absent in both 
Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, it has been greatly developed and construed 
in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. The Rome Statute followed the 
same approach in regard to the complicity in genocide as towards the 
attempt to commit genocide not distinguishing the concept of complicity 
generally from the concept of complicity in genocide specifically327.  It 
could be also recognized as a step backward from the practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals. The concept of complicity in genocide should be singled out from 
the concept of complicity in general due to the peculiarities of mens rea and 
actus reus of the crime of complicity in genocide. As it was ruled by the ad 
hoc tribunals, the crime of complicity in genocide does not necessarily 
require the existence of the specific intent (dolus specialis) and merely the 
presence of knowledge of the genocidal plan is sufficient in order to 
establish individual criminal responsibility328. Under Article 6 (1) and 7 (1) 
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes actus reus of complicity in the form of 
aiding and abetting to genocide could be in the form of omission, namely, 
failure to act or refrain from action329. In contrast, other forms of complicity 
do require a positive action.  
 
The aforesaid specific legal characteristics of the complicity in genocide 
stand apart from the general concept of complicity, and consequently, the 
approach towards complicity in genocide developed by the ad hoc tribunals 
is consistent with the development of international criminal law. 
Summarizing aforementioned analysis of the concept of complicity towards 
the crime of genocide as provided in the Rome Statute, one can conclude 
that ICC has failed to adopt the progressive concept developed by its 
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predecessors and as a result, the confusion while applying the law is 
inevitable in future proceedings. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals more than one decade ago was 
met with skepticism and doubts from the international community whether 
those tribunals could be effective mechanisms to combat international 
crimes including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Despite numerous structural and procedural problems, the ad hoc tribunals 
have contributed significantly to the new evolving culture of human rights 
reaffirming the “link between an established system of individual 
accountability and the maintenance of international peace and security”330. 
The advancement of the idea of global justice has been reflected in the 
establishment of the ICC. 
 
The legal provisions of the Genocide Convention on the crime of genocide 
seen as an effective tool to prosecute perpetrators were not internationally 
applied prior to the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals that were 
empowered to exercise the jurisdiction over the crimes of the greatest 
concern to the humankind including the crime of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Over the years tribunals have proven capability to 
charge, prosecute and convict those responsible for the heinous crime of 
genocide developing a substantive body of international criminal law.  
 
The ICC in its Rome Statute has incorporated various criminal law 
conceptions and solutions from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. 
Hence, it is helpful to look back at the tribunals’ experience with regard to 
the crime of genocide to foresee further applicability of certain concepts 
developed by the ICC predecessors including possible obstacles to be 
encountered by the ICC while incriminating the crime as genocide in 
possible future criminal proceedings.  
 
Concluding words aim to summarize the analysis conducted in the previous 
chapters and point out at the key points of the whole study. The work has 
been an effort to clarify on the current development of the concept of 
genocide in international law. The analysis was limited to the study of legal 
instruments and case law of the ad hoc tribunals and ICC, for the crime of 
genocide has been analyzed from the perspective of the individual criminal 
responsibility and thus the state responsibility for the crime of genocide 
within the framework of the ICJ has been excluded from the scope of study.  
 
It has been challenging to write on the topic due to abundance of material 
available on the crime of genocide within the practice of the ad hoc tribunals 
and the lack of the research and material on the prospects of the effective 
prosecution of the crime of genocide in the ICC.  
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The material provided in the first two chapters of the study has served as a 
solid ground to define the key issues that ICC might be facing while 
implementing the law of genocide. Many concepts outlined in first two 
chapters were discussed from the drafting history standpoint so the 
applicability of those concepts to the crime of genocide and respective 
interpretation of the ad hoc tribunals on the crime would be understood from 
a better perspective to the reader.  
 
The current concept of the crime of genocide as developed by the ad hoc 
tribunals could be reflected in the key legal aspects as follows: 
 
● The prohibition of the crime of genocide rests on the conventional 
and customary rules of international law.  
 
● The centerpiece of the law of genocide is the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; other legal 
instruments seeking to punish the crime of genocide are accordingly 
the ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
 
● The definition of genocide, as provided in Article 2 (2) of the 
ICTR Statute, Article 4 (2) of the ICTY Statute, and Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute, cites, verbatim, Articles 2 of the Genocide 
Convention. 
 
● The conviction of genocide requires the actus reus or material 
element of the offence, consisting of one or more of the acts 
enumerated in the Genocide Convention, ICTY Statute, ICTR 
Statute or Rome Statute.  
 
● The conviction of genocide requires the mental element (mens rea) 
of the offence, consisting of the special intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
 
● Conspiracy to commit genocide is recognized as a distinct crime 
along with the direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide pursuant to 
the provisions of the Genocide Convention, the ICTY, and ICTR 
Statutes. 
 
● An accused can be held liable for genocide while applying the 
concept of the JCE, when his/her knowledge extends to the 
genocidal act and principal’s genocidal intent. 
 
● The concept of command responsibility can been applied in 
genocide cases, however, the ad hoc tribunals did not expresses their 
opinion on mens rea standard with regard to dolus specialis. 
 
The conclusions in the last Chapter have been predominantly drawn from 
the critical legal analysis conducted in the previous Chapters discussing the 
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legal definition of the crime of genocide along with other punishable crimes 
of genocide. 
 
However, many questions posed in the given work on possible applicability 
of certain concepts and approaches of the ad hoc tribunals in the ICC remain 
unanswerable prior to commencement of trials on the crime of genocide.  
 
The extensive analysis of the aforementioned legal aspects of the crime of 
genocide in the context of the international legal instruments and case law 
along with the analysis of travaux preparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention has obviously assisted while working on the very last Chapter 
of the work. Of regret is the fact that the conclusions drawn in the last 
Chapter are not promising enough, for it appears that the ICC failed to 
incorporate some progressive developments and cure the legal approach to 
the crime of genocide of its major shortcomings, in particular: 
 
● The boundaries of mens rea requirement towards the crime of 
genocide remain blurring – the interrelation between categories of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘special intent’ is undefined in a precise and 
coherent manner.  
 
● The concept of conspiracy to commit genocide was ignored in the 
text of the Rome Statute excluding one of the most preventive tools 
to combat the crime of genocide at the early stages. 
 
● The Rome Statute embedded general provisions on complicity and 
attempt to commit an offense applicable to all crimes penalized 
under the Statute failing to show a significant difference between 
complicity in general and complicity in genocide; attempt to commit 
a crime and attempt to commit genocide.  
 
● The applicability of concepts of the joint criminal enterprise and 
command responsibility towards the crime of genocide requiring 
special mens rea standard remains to be seen in further ICC 
jurisprudence. 
 
The work has drawn an attention to some existing inconsistency in the 
development of the international criminal theory touching upon the crime of 
genocide together with other concepts that appear to be applicable to the 
crime. The well-developed international criminal law theory entitling to 
work with the precise definitions of the crime is the sine qua non condition 
for the successful trial and thus the crime of genocide outlined in the clear 
and coherent manner would be of great help to all actors in the criminal 
justice system. 
 
In a sum, the ICC unfettered by the restraints of its predecessors has a 
greater opportunity to strengthen, refine and develop the body of 
international law on the crime of genocide. Although some of the failings of 
the Rome Statute are obviously seen (it has been extensively discussed in 
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the text body of the work and singled out in the conclusion), the final 
outcome depends upon the manner in which judges of the Court perceive 
their role and the role of the Court in the development of international law. 
Due to the fact that ICC’s powers to prosecute are limited to states parties of 
the Rome Statute, much will depend upon traditional inter-state cooperation 
in criminal matters. 
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